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ABSTRACT
One of the lingering questions about the law of regulatory takings
concerns the proper scope and application of the Supreme Court’s
exactions jurisprudence, known as the Nollan/Dolan test. A recur-
ring issue in the case law is the extent to which the Nollan/Dolan
framework applies to takings challenges brought against develop-
ment impact fees. Judicial decisions on the issue split over two pri-
mary questions. First, there is a debate about whether Nollan/Dolan
is limited to physical exactions or whether the test might also apply
to monetary exactions as well. Second, there is a difference of opinion
over whether Nollan/Dolan applies only to exactions imposed in an
ad hoc, adjudicative manner or also to exactions that are more
broadly-applicable and established legislatively. These questions are
important, but the primary emphasis on them has diminished the
focus on other issues that also require attention. In particular, there
is a need to situate impact fees within the law of local government
financing—that is, determining whether they operate as fees or
taxes—because the answer to that question will influence the proper
level of Takings Clause scrutiny to which they should be subjected.
Only after wrestling with all of these issues can one move to the
ultimate query of what analytical test is most appropriate. 
This Article attempts to answer these questions, fit impact fees into
the Court’s current takings jurisprudence, propose a new rule of
decision for impact fee cases, and demonstrate how that rule might
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apply to basic factual situations. In addition, this Article suggests
several larger questions implicated by the impact fee problem that
continue to require judicial and scholarly attention.
2010]   ANALYZING DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES AS TAKINGS 1835
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1836
I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REGULATORY 
TAKINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1841
A. The Standard Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1842
B. The Exactions Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1843
C. Application to Impact Fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1844
II. DEFINING “EXACTION” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1845
A. Relevant Supreme Court Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1845
1. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission . . . . . . . . . 1846
2. Dolan v. City of Tigard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1847
3. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1849
B. Only Physical Dedications? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1850
1. Differences Between Land and Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1850
2. Similarities Between Physical and 
Monetary Exactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1853
C. Only Adjudicative Decisions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1859
III. CLASSIFYING IMPACT FEES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1865
A. Of Taxes and Takings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1866
B. Fees or Taxes? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1868
IV. ARTICULATING THE APPROPRIATE TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1875
A. Benefits of a Hybrid Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1876
B. Mechanics of a Hybrid Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1879
C. Applications of a Hybrid Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1883
1. Scenario One—Both Factors 
Favor the Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1885
2. Scenario Two—Both Factors 
Favor the Challenger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1887
3. Scenario Three—One Factor 
Favors Each Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1889
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1891
1836 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1833
INTRODUCTION
One of the lingering questions about the law of regulatory
takings is the proper scope and application of the Supreme Court’s
exactions jurisprudence. Developed in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission1 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,2 and unanimously reaf-
firmed in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,3 the analytical framework
for exaction cases applies a form of heightened scrutiny to evaluate
whether the challenged exaction constitutes a taking of private
property.4 Although much has been written on this framework by
both lower courts5 and scholars,6 the full parameters of the frame-
work remain uncertain. Indeed, several members of the Supreme
Court have recognized the existence of issues that require the
Court’s further attention.7 Among those issues is whether—and if
so, how—the Nollan/Dolan standards should apply to takings chal-
lenges brought against development impact fees.
Impact fees are generally defined as one-time charges assessed
against new development projects to help finance the cost of public
improvements necessitated by those projects.8 The fees normally are
charged early in the regulatory process as a condition of develop-
1. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
2. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
3. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
4. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386-96 (applying “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality”
standards).
5. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz.
1997) (en banc); San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of S.F., 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002); Krupp
v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Waters Landing Ltd.
P’ship v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712 (Md. 1994); Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton v.
City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates
Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004); B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 128 P.3d
1161 (Utah 2006); City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802 (Wash. 2006) (en banc).
6. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 439 n.6 (Cal. 1996) (plurality opinion)
(“Scholarly comment on the two cases is almost unmanageably large.”).
7. See, e.g., Lambert v. City & County of S.F., 529 U.S. 1045, 1046-49 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Parking Ass’n of Ga.
v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117-18 (1995) (Thomas, J., joined by O’Connor, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
8. See, e.g., Arthur C. Nelson, Development Impact Fees: The Next Generation, 26 URB.
LAW. 541, 541 (1994); Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use
Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 205 (2006).
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ment approval.9 Scholars agree that impact fees evolved from the
same type of exactions that were at issue in Nollan and Dolan—
regulatory approval conditioned on physical dedication of land to
public use.10 Impact fees present a much more flexible financing
option, however, because they need not be tied to the specific site
under development in the same way as a physical dedication.11
Whereas a dedication requirement may restrict a government from
acting outside the geographical proximity of the proposed develop-
ment project, impact fees can be applied more easily to improving
off-site, system-wide infrastructure.12 This feature renders impact
fees more advantageous to the government, whose primary purpose
in imposing exactions is to shift the cost of public improvements to
the developer.13 At the same time, “[i]t is this detachment from the
actual location of land development that makes impact fees so
controversial and so often subject to legal attack.”14
It seems clear that the use of impact fees by local governments is
on the rise. Measured by enabling legislation alone, in 2002 twenty-
four states allowed impact fees, as compared to only three states in
1986.15 A study published in 2000 by the General Accounting Office
found that 59 percent of cities having more than 25,000 residents
impose impact fees, as do 39 percent of counties in metropolitan
areas.16 These numbers support the conclusion “that impact fees are
prevalent and that their use is growing.”17
9. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 205.
10. Id. at 199-204 (tracing the history of development exactions from land dedication
requirements to fees in lieu of such dedication to modern impact fees); accord JULIAN CONRAD
JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION
LAW 345-46, 351 (2d ed. 2007); Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 479-80 (1991).
11. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 206.
12. Id.; see also JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 351.
13. See Been, supra note 10, at 482 (characterizing cost shifting as “main reason” that
local governments impose exactions); Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 191 (describing
“unmistakable trend ... towards a system of local government ‘non-financing’ through
increased reliance on cost-shifting to the developer”). 
14. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 206.
15. Id. at 207 n.106.
16. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: LOCAL GROWTH ISSUES—
FEDERAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 33, 102 (2000), http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/
rc00178.pdf.
17. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 207.
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The amount of money charged for impact fees is also growing.
A recent study shows that, between 2004 and 2008, the average
nonutility impact fee per single family unit rose by 76 percent
nationwide.18 These numbers represent an average annual increase
of approximately 15 percent over the four years in question,19 which
significantly outpaced the rate of construction cost inflation during
the same period.20 With this rate of growth, it is likely that legal
challenges to impact fees also will increase.
Among these challenges, those based on the Takings Clause21—
that is, assertions that impact fees amount to takings of private
property without just compensation—have proved to be particularly
bothersome analytically. The Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue, but several of its pronouncements about regulatory takings
generally, and exactions specifically, have fueled a nationwide
debate on the matter. State courts in particular have produced a
variety of ways to evaluate whether and when an impact fee
amounts to a taking.22 
The debate has principally focused on two subordinate inquiries.
First, courts and commentators have questioned whether monetary
payments qualify as exactions under the Nollan/Dolan framework
or whether the test established in those decisions is limited to
physical exactions only.23 Second, assuming the Court’s exactions
framework might apply to payments of money, it is unsettled
18. DUNCAN ASSOCS., NATIONAL IMPACT FEE SURVEY: 2008, at 7 (2008), available at
http://www.impactfees.com/publications%20pdf/2008_survey.pdf.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 11.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation.”).
22. See supra note 5.
23. See Daniel A. Jacobs, Indigestion from Eating Crow: The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. on the Future of Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 38 URB. LAW. 451, 482 (2006)
(suggesting that “monetary exactions are outside [Nollan/Dolan’s] sphere of applicability”);
Lauren Reznick, Note, The Death of Nollan and Dolan? Challenging the Constitutionality of
Monetary Exactions in the Wake of Lingle v. Chevron, 87 B.U. L. REV. 725, 755-57 (2007)
(arguing that Nollan/Dolan can be applicable to monetary exactions as well as physical
dedications). Compare, e.g., McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995)
(distinguishing physical dedication in Dolan from the payment of fees), with Town of
Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 635 (Tex. 2004) (“We do not
read Dolan even to hint that [monetary] exactions should be analyzed differently than
dedications.”).
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24. Compare San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 104-06 (Cal. 2002)
(distinguishing between ad hoc and legislative fees, and applying Nollan/Dolan only to
former), with Town of Flower Mound, 135 S.W.3d at 641-42 (rejecting “bright-line
adjudicative/legislative distinction”).
whether that framework applies only to payments imposed in an
adjudicative, ad hoc manner or to broadly-applicable, legislatively-
determined fees as well.24
These questions are important because their answers will help
define the constitutional meaning of the term “exaction” for pur-
poses of a takings analysis. Accordingly, these questions must be
addressed in any evaluation of the impact fee problem. But the
primary emphasis on these two questions has, to some degree,
diminished other issues that must also be confronted.
Even assuming that some monetary payments might qualify as
an exaction for purposes of Nollan/Dolan, it remains to be seen
whether impact fees should be among them. Other types of mone-
tary obligations might more easily be viewed as exactions. For
example, an “in lieu” fee imposed as a direct alternative to a re-
quired physical dedication looks like an exaction because of its
inextricable connection to the dedication itself. Impact fees, on the
other hand, are not linked to a would-be dedication, and they share
characteristics with other types of financing mechanisms that have
been viewed as less offensive to the Takings Clause. Much of what
renders the analysis of impact fees so difficult is the question of how
to classify them. Should impact fees be viewed as land use regula-
tions, or similar devices rooted in the government’s police power, or
are they levies justified under its taxing authority? Do the fees
confer special benefits, prevent unique societal harms, or finance
community-wide programs that inure to the advantage of society as
a whole? To what extent should the infrastructure they help finance
be viewed as a general obligation of local government and to what
extent should it be laid specially at the feet of new development?
Only after wrestling with these questions, as well as the two
previously mentioned, can one move to the ultimate query of what
analytical test is most appropriate.
This Article seeks to answer these questions, and, in the process,
make a worthwhile contribution to the existing literature on regu-
latory takings. While much has been written on exactions generally,
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only a fraction of the previous scholarship specifically or extensively
addresses the issue of impact fees. Among the literature that does
address the problem of impact fees, there is a tendency to follow the
courts in highlighting the physical/monetary and adjudicative/
legislative distinctions, thus arguing either for or against the
application of an unaltered Nollan/Dolan test based on the degree
to which those distinctions seem sound.25 The need exists for a
treatment that not only addresses these distinctions but also
situates impact fees within the context of municipal financing and
then works out a rule of decision that takes all of these issues into
account.
I hope to satisfy that need in the following manner. Part I reviews
the analytical frameworks established by the Supreme Court for
evaluating regulatory takings challenges. Because these frame-
works are firmly entrenched in the law of takings,26 I assume their
continued vitality despite any of their inherent possible problems.
Accordingly, I also assume that these frameworks, in one form or
another, will provide the basis for considering challenges to impact
fees, with the likelihood of a successful challenge depending on how
the specific framework is configured. Part II seeks to evaluate what
should qualify as an “exaction” for purposes of these frameworks,
paying special attention to the distinctions between monetary and
physical exactions, as well as between adjudicative and legislative
decisions. Ultimately, I believe that both distinctions should be
rejected to the extent they create formalistic, bright-line categories.
Part III attempts to classify development impact fees, focusing par-
ticularly on how they compare to and differ from “fees” and “taxes,”
25. See, e.g., Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan Deal—Bridging the Legislative/
Adjudicative Divide, 38 URB. LAW. 487, 501-21 (2006) (opposing adjudicative/legislative
distinction and arguing that Nollan/Dolan should apply to legislative exactions in full
measure); Jacobs, supra note 23, at 481-82 (noting that monetary fees appear to be outside
the scope of Nollan/Dolan); Jane C. Needleman, Note, Exactions: Exploring Exactly When
Nollan and Dolan Should Be Triggered, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1563, 1581-90 (2006) (arguing
that monetary and legislative exactions should be scrutinized under Nollan/Dolan); Reznick,
supra note 23, at 755-57 (arguing that Nollan/Dolan can be applicable to monetary exactions
as well as physical dedications).
26. See generally Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (unanimously
reaffirming tests established in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978), Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1803 (1992), and Nollan/Dolan).
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as those terms are generally used in the context of municipal
financing. This Part concludes that impact fees, in fact, share char-
acteristics with both of these mechanisms and, therefore, are
properly viewed as a doctrinal and theoretical hybrid. Drawing on
the previous sections, Part IV discusses the appropriate test for
evaluating claims that impact fees amount to unconstitutional
takings, proposing a hybrid test that incorporates the main features
of Nollan/Dolan into the more standard framework applicable to
nonexaction takings claims. Additionally, this Part demonstrates
how the test might work in practice, applying the test to three
hypothetical scenarios drawn from actual cases. Finally, the Article
offers concluding remarks and raises theoretical and doctrinal
questions implicated by its discussion of the impact fee problem.
I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS
To better appreciate the problems presented when development
impact fees are challenged as unconstitutional takings, it is helpful
to understand the analytical frameworks available to courts
confronting the issue. Conventional wisdom has long held that the
Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence is “muddled,”
“confused,” and presents a “constitutional quagmire.”27 Although
these labels have been much deserved, I have written elsewhere28
that the Court commenced the long-overdue process of bringing
some clarity to this area of the law with its 2005 decision in Lingle
v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.29
As I have explained, a strong case can be made that Lingle
implicitly groups the Court’s regulatory takings opinions into two
27. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential Long-Term Impact
of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69 ALB. L.
REV. 343, 343 (2005) (“Regulatory takings often is considered one of the most doctrinally
confused areas of constitutional law.”); Mark W. Cordes, Takings Jurisprudence as Three-
Tiered Review, 20 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (2006) (“Takings jurisprudence has long
been and remains, in the opinion of many, a constitutional quagmire.”); Stewart E. Sterk, The
Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 205 (2004)
(“Conventional wisdom teaches that the Supreme Court’s takings doctrine is a muddle.”).
28. See generally Michael B. Kent, Jr., Construing the Canon: An Exegesis of Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence After Lingle v. Chevron, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 63 (2008). The following
discussion is based on observations made in that article.
29. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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analytical frameworks—the first applying to the majority of takings
challenges and the second applying to the special context of land use
exactions.30 Each framework is designed to determine whether a
particular regulatory action burdens an owner’s core property
rights—that is, the rights of exclusion, possession, use, and dispo-
sition—so onerously that it should be considered the functional
equivalent of a direct appropriation of property.31 If so, then a
taking has occurred for which the owner must receive just compen-
sation.32
A. The Standard Analysis
The first framework for analyzing takings claims, which I have
dubbed the “standard analysis,” presents three primary questions
to aid in this determination. First, this framework asks whether
the challenger can prove that the regulation at issue required a
permanent physical invasion or occupation of his property.33 If so,
then the regulation results in a taking regardless of the amount of
land occupied, the economic impact on the property owner, or the
public interests served by the regulation.34 
Where there is no permanent invasion or occupation, however,
the framework asks a second question—whether the challenger can
prove that the regulation deprived him of all beneficial or productive
economic use of his property.35 An affirmative answer to this second
question raises the presumption that a taking has occurred, shifting
the burden to the government to show that the regulation goes no
further than what could be accomplished under the law of nuisance
or similar “background principles” of the law of property.36 When the
government meets this burden, no compensable taking has occur-
red; conversely, when the government fails to make the necessary
30. See Kent, supra note 28, at 94-106.
31. See id. at 89.
32. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536-37.
33. See Kent, supra note 28, at 94-95.
34. See id.; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1015 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-38 (1982).
35. See Kent, supra note 28, at 95.
36. See id.; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-32.
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showing, the presumption of a taking stands and compensation is
due.37
Finally, if the answer to both of the first two inquiries is negative,
this framework asks a third question: how closely does the regula-
tion resemble both a permanent physical invasion and a total
economic deprivation?38 The answer to this last question ultimately
depends on the ad hoc balancing test established in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.39 At this stage, whether a
taking has occurred depends on the court’s assessment of: (1) the
economic impact of the regulation in light of the owner’s distinct,
investment-backed expectations; and (2) the character of the gov-
ernmental action.40
B. The Exactions Analysis
In addition to the foregoing framework, which seemingly applies
to the majority of regulatory takings claims, Lingle endorses a
second analytical framework for the special context of land use
exactions. This framework, based on the Court’s decisions in Nollan
and Dolan, also asks three primary questions. First, the framework
asks whether the government possesses a sufficient interest to deny
the challenger’s proposed land use altogether.41 Although the ques-
tion is asked, the Court so far has never probed for an answer,
instead simply assuming that any interest offered by the govern-
ment is sufficient to deny the challenger’s proposed use in total.42
Thus, this question really serves more as an analytical placeholder
than an actual inquiry.43 
Second, once the government’s interest has been established, the
framework looks to see whether an “essential nexus” exists between
that interest and the exaction being requested of the property
37. See Kent, supra note 28, at 96.
38. See id.
39. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
40. See Kent, supra note 28, at 96-101; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39.
41. See Kent, supra note 28, at 102; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1987).
42. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-36.
43. See Kent, supra note 28, at 103.
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owner.44 If not, then the exaction looks like little more than
extortion, and a compensable taking has occurred.45 
If the required nexus does exist, however, the framework moves
to the final question—whether the requested exaction is “roughly
proportional” to the impact of the proposed land use on whatever
interest the government seeks to protect.46 Although the Court has
not defined “rough proportionality” with precision, it has made clear
that the burden falls on the government to make some type of
individualized, quantifiable determination that the exaction will
help alleviate the public harm expected to result from the proposed
land use.47 When this heightened scrutiny can be satisfied, the
exaction is not a taking of private property; when the burden is not
met, a taking has occurred.
C. Application to Impact Fees
While the foregoing frameworks go a long way in providing
some clarity to the law of regulatory takings, several issues remain
unresolved.48 One of these issues, which is of particular importance
to this Article, is how these frameworks apply to takings challenges
levied against development impact fees. The answer to this question
has obvious significance. Because impact fees normally do not
require a permanent physical invasion and rarely will work a total
economic deprivation, applying the standard analysis to impact fees
will almost always render the Penn Central factors of primary
consequence. And since these factors, in practice, are much more
deferential to the government’s action than the more heightened
scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan framework, application of the standard
analysis can be expected to favor a conclusion that no taking has
occurred. Application of the exactions analysis, on the other hand,
places a more significant burden on the government and, therefore,
is likely to result in more findings favorable to the challenger. Thus,
as in other areas of constitutional law, the choice of analytical test
44. See id. at 104; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386; Nollan, 483
U.S. at 836-37.
45. See Kent, supra note 28, at 105-06.
46. See id. at 106; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
47. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391, 395-96.
48. See Kent, supra note 28, at 107-08 (discussing issues left unanswered by Lingle).
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and concomitant level of scrutiny can be outcome-determinative.
The appropriate choice for analyzing development impact fees is the
question to which the remainder of this Article devotes itself.
II. DEFINING “EXACTION”
On one level, the question of how to treat challenges to impact
fees seems easily answered. If the fees qualify as exactions, then the
second framework, based on Nollan and Dolan, should be utilized.
Otherwise, assertions that impact fees qualify as unconstitutional
takings of property should be evaluated under the standard analy-
sis, usually meaning the Penn Central factors. A primary problem,
however, is that it remains unclear precisely what qualifies as an
“exaction” for purposes of the Takings Clause.49
For this reason, to determine which analytical framework more
properly applies to impact fees, one must first grapple with the
competing views about the appropriate meaning of “exaction.” As
explained above, this requires an evaluation of two issues subject to
much debate: (1) whether exactions are strictly limited to physical
dedications of property or might also include requirements for
monetary payments; and (2) whether exactions encompass only
those determinations made in an individualized, adjudicative
fashion or also include broadly-applicable, legislative decisions as
well.50 This Part seeks to review the contours of the debate and
provide guidance on how the questions should be answered.
A. Relevant Supreme Court Decisions
The debate over the foregoing questions has been fueled in
large part by the Supreme Court’s own exaction pronouncements.
49. See Needleman, supra note 25, at 1563 n.3 (listing various scholarly and judicial
definitions of “exaction”).
50. See, e.g., DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 225-27 (2002)
(identifying these issues as unresolved). No less than three petitions for certiorari were filed
with the Supreme Court in 2009 raising one or both of these issues. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 7-16, Action Apartment Ass’n v. City of Santa Monica, No. 08-1139 (U.S. Mar.
10, 2009), 2009 WL 663951; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13-14, McClung v. City of
Sumner, No. 08-1102 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2009), 2009 WL 559324; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
5, Joy Builders, Inc. v. Town of Clarkston, No. 08-1099 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2009), 2009 WL 559321.
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Although the Court has never decided either question, the context
and language of several of its opinions—particularly Nollan, Dolan,
and Lingle—have served as the basis for the distinctions made by
some courts and commentators between physical and monetary
exactions, as well as between adjudicative and legislative regula-
tions. A review of these decisions thus proves useful.
1. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 
The Court first tackled the issue of land use exactions in Nollan.
In that case, the California Coastal Commission conditioned the
approval of a development permit on the applicants granting a
lateral easement across their parcel so as to connect two public
beaches that lay on either side.51 The Commission justified this
condition by asserting that the new house would obstruct the
beaches from view of the road, impairing the public’s “visual access”
to the beaches.52 This impairment, in turn, would create a “psycho-
logical barrier” to physical access because the obstructed view would
make it more difficult for people to realize that the beaches were
open to the public.53 The applicants filed suit, asserting that the
condition amounted to an unconstitutional taking of their property.
In considering the applicants’ challenge, the Court assumed that
the Commission’s interest in overcoming the “psychological barrier”
was sufficient to allow it to deny the development permit outright.54
But the Court noted that the Commission’s alternative course of
action—requiring an easement as a condition for permit approval
—could be upheld only if the easement bore an “essential nexus” to
that interest.55 
The connection was necessary, suggested the Court, because of
the exaction’s burdensome nature—that is, a permanent physical
occupation of the applicants’ property that normally would qualify
as a taking per se.56 The conditional, rather than mandatory, nature
of the easement, however, arguably justified a different outcome. If
51. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).
52. Id. at 838.
53. See id. at 828-29, 838.
54. Id. at 835.
55. Id. at 837.
56. Id. at 831-32.
2010]   ANALYZING DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES AS TAKINGS 1847
the Commission could deny the permit altogether, the Court ac-
knowledged that giving the applicants a choice between denial or
approval conditioned on the granting of an easement might be a
valid exercise of the state’s police power for which no compensation
need be paid.57
For the state to avoid paying compensation, however, any
alternative to outright denial had to serve the same interest as
outright denial—in this case, protecting “visual access” and over-
coming “psychological barriers” to the adjoining beaches.58 The
lateral easement sought by the government failed to serve those
interests.59 Accordingly, the Commission had not presented the
property owners with a valid choice between two legitimate
regulatory options. Rather, in the eyes of the Court, the Commis-
sion’s action amounted to “an out-and-out plan of extortion”
designed to avoid the requirement of just compensation.60
2. Dolan v. City of Tigard
Seven years after Nollan, the Court revisited the issue of land use
exactions in Dolan.61 As in Nollan, the property owner in Dolan
applied for a development permit, which was granted by the city on
the conditions that she dedicate portions of her property for
improvement of the city’s storm drainage system and for a pedes-
trian/bicycle pathway.62 These conditions were imposed pursuant to
the city’s Community Development Code, which required such
dedications for any development within or adjacent to the 100-year
floodplain or within the city’s Central Business District.63 The city
thus justified the conditions on two grounds: (1) the applicant’s
property fell within the floodplain, which would be adversely
affected by the proposed development; and (2) the applicant’s
57. Id. at 836-37.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 838 (“It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already
on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans’ property reduces any obstacles to
viewing the beach created by the new house.”).
60. Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)).
61. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
62. Id. at 380.
63. Id. at 378-80.
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property also fell within the city’s Central Business District, which
would see an increase in traffic congestion as a result of the
proposed development.64 Thus, according to the city, the dedications
were necessary to alleviate both the risk of increased flooding and
increased vehicular traffic caused by the applicant’s project.
Again assuming that the city’s stated interests were sufficient to
deny the permit outright, the Supreme Court sought to explain a
second time how the required dedications differed from the usual
land-use regulation for which compensation normally was not due.65
The usual regulation, the Court explained, “involved essentially
legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city,
whereas here the city made an adjudicative decision to condition
petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual
parcel.”66 Additionally, “the conditions imposed were not simply a
limitation on the use petitioner might make of her own parcel, but
a requirement that she deed portions of the property to the city.”67 
These characteristics required a more exacting scrutiny like the
one applied in Nollan. But unlike in Nollan, the Court agreed that
the conditions here bore an “essential nexus” to the city’s stated
interests.68 Even so, the Court added a second step to the analysis,
explaining that the city also had to demonstrate that there was a
“rough proportionality” between the easements and the likely
impact of the applicant’s development on flooding and traffic
congestion.69 As a result, to avoid paying compensation, the city had
to “make some sort of individualized determination that the
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development.”70 Because the city had not
done so, the exactions amounted to an uncompensated taking.71
64. Id. at 381-83.
65. Id. at 385.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 387.
69. Id. at 391.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 393-96.
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3. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
The final decision deserving of attention is the Court’s unanimous
opinion in Lingle.72 Although that case did not involve a challenge
to a land-use exaction, it did present the Court with an opportunity
to elucidate its regulatory takings jurisprudence. In doing so, the
Court reaffirmed both Nollan and Dolan and offered an explanation
of both decisions.
In each of those cases, the Court noted, its analysis began with
the proposition that the required easements would have constituted
per se physical takings had the government simply demanded
them.73 The question presented by each case was whether the
conditional nature of the easement changed the conclusion that a
taking had occurred.74 Thus, the Court strongly suggested that it
was both the “onerous”75 nature of the exactions involved, coupled
with the unique context of “adjudicative ... demands that a land-
owner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her property
as a condition of obtaining a development permit,”76 that necessi-
tated the special Nollan/Dolan framework. 
Moreover, picking up on a theme raised in Dolan itself, the Court
explained that this framework
involve[s] a special application of the “doctrine of ‘unconstitu-
tional conditions,’” which provides that “the government may not
require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right
to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public
use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the
government where the benefit has little or no relationship to the
property.”77
72. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
73. Id. at 546.
74. Id. at 546-47.
75. Id. at 547.
76. Id. at 546; see also id. at 547 (noting that Court has not extended Nollan/Dolan
framework “beyond the special context of [such] exactions” (quoting City of Monterrey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999))).
77. Id. at 547 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)).
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B. Only Physical Dedications?
Drawing on the context and language of the foregoing decisions,
there has developed a split in authority, especially among the state
courts, on the proper scope of the Nollan/Dolan framework. One of
the primary issues is whether Nollan/Dolan’s nexus and proportion-
ality requirements apply only to dedicatory exactions, like the ones
at issue in those cases, or whether they include monetary exactions
as well.78 Although good arguments exist on both sides of the
question, for the reasons given below I think the better argument is
that the requirements of nexus and proportionality apply to mone-
tary exactions as well as physical dedications.
1. Differences Between Land and Money
As an initial matter, serious arguments exist for limiting the
exactions framework to physical dedications. First, there is the lang-
uage of the opinions themselves. Although some courts perhaps
have been too quick to create categories based on isolated state-
ments,79 it is beyond dispute that the Supreme Court takes the idea
of physical invasion seriously in the context of exactions as well as
with regulatory takings in general. Both Nollan and Dolan empha-
sized that the physical exaction of property is particularly trouble-
78. Compare, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993,
1000 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (distinguishing Dolan from the imposition of a fee), Krupp v.
Breckinridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 697 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (holding that
Nollan/Dolan is not applicable to development fees), McCarthy v. Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845
(Kan. 1995) (distinguishing Dolan from the imposition of a fee), Waters Landing Ltd. P’ship
v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712, 724 (Md. 1994) (reading Dolan as inapplicable to a
“development impact tax”), and City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 808 (Wash. 2006)
(en banc) (distinguishing dedications from fees for purposes of Nollan/Dolan), with San Remo
Hotel L.P. v. City & County of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 105-06 (Cal. 2002) (acknowledging that
Nollan/Dolan applies to some fee requirements), N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n v. County of
DuPage, 649 N.E.2d 384, 389-90 (Ill. 1995) (applying heightened scrutiny akin to
Nollan/Dolan to impact fees), Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 821, 825
(N.Y. 2003) (applying Nollan/Dolan to an in lieu fee), Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton v. City
of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 355-56 (Ohio 2000) (applying Nollan/Dolan to impact fees),
and Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 639-40 (Tex.
2004) (analyzing a monetary exaction under Nollan/Dolan).
79. See Needleman, supra note 25, at 1577 (accusing some courts of relying on
“approaches balanced precariously on bits of language extracted from the opinions of Nollan
and Dolan”).
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some,80 and Lingle underscored that the Court has not applied its
exactions framework outside of this unique context.81 I have sug-
gested that these statements, taken at face value, “strongly indicate
[the Court’s intention] that the exaction analysis applies only to
physical dedications and not to monetary exactions.”82 Even so,
these statements should not be given too definitive a reading.
Because none of the cases presented a challenge to a nondedicatory
exaction, the Court had no need to carefully consider whether the
Nollan/Dolan framework included monetary exactions. Moreover,
anecdotal evidence suggests that the Court, or at least some of its
members, do not view these statements as decisive of the issue.83
Nonetheless, the Court’s pronouncements in Nollan, Dolan, and
Lingle, when coupled with its doctrinal explanations about what
constitutes a regulatory taking, provide a strong rationale for
limiting exactions to physical dedications of land. Lingle clarified
that the Court’s takings jurisprudence was designed “to identify
regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic
taking in which government directly appropriates private property
or ousts the owner from his domain.”84 This “functional equivalence”
standard seems to focus on the burdens that the challenged reg-
ulation imposes on the owner’s core property rights of exclusion,
possession, use, and disposition.85 A regulation imposing a perma-
nent physical invasion of property, for example, qualifies as a cate-
gorical taking precisely because of the onerous effects it has on these
core rights.86 
80. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (distinguishing conditions at issue from usual land use
regulations in part because conditions involved “a requirement that [the applicant] deed
portions of the property to the city”); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987)
(“We are inclined to be particularly careful ... where the actual conveyance of property is made
a condition to the lifting of a land-use restriction.”).
81. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547.
82. Kent, supra note 28, at 103.
83. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231, 1231 (1994) (5-4 decision)
(remanding monetary exaction case for reconsideration in light of Dolan); see also Lambert
v. City & County of S.F., 529 U.S. 1045, 1047-48 (2000) (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy &
Thomas, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (suggesting Nollan/Dolan might apply to
“demand[s] for money or other property”).
84. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
85. See Kent, supra note 28, at 89-92 (discussing “functional equivalence” and its relation
to core property rights).
86. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982).
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Regulations that require the payment of money in connection
with land use, by contrast, affect these rights less directly. Monetary
obligations usually do not produce immediate restraints on an
owner’s rights to exclude, possess, or dispose of the property to
which the obligation is connected. And although the use of the
connected parcel may be limited until payment has been tendered,
it will be rare that such a restriction is appreciably more arduous
than what the government could accomplish via normal zoning reg-
ulations.87 Indeed, the first analytical premise of both Nollan and
Dolan is that the government could have denied the proposed land
use altogether. Therefore, it is more difficult to view monetary
exactions as functionally equivalent to a direct appropriation or
ouster. As one court put it, the payment of money appears to be “a
considerably more benign form of regulation.”88
Related to this difficulty is the unique status enjoyed by real
property in our legal system. Land has been described as “a darling
of Anglo-American law” and has received special treatment vis-à-vis
other types of property for a variety of reasons.89 Unlike chattels, for
example, land is “immovable and place-specific” and, along with its
associated rights and obligations, historically served as a “special
form of wealth.”90 In addition to these attributes, land’s uniqueness
flows from its individual and societal importance: “The ownership
of real property changes status; it imparts personhood; it gives rise
to expectations; it shapes our culture. Land is unique because once
we own it, it bestows special benefits upon us and defines us in ways
87. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (noting that “the authority of
state and local governments to engage in land use planning has been sustained against
constitutional challenge as long ago as our decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.”);
see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (“The property owner
necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various
measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers.”). This, of
course, assumes that the fee is not so oppressive as to deprive all economically beneficial use
from the connected property. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (reaffirming the categorical rule from
Lucas).
88. Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz.
1997) (en banc). But see infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text (arguing that monetary
exactions can impose serious burdens on property owner).
89. Nancy Perkins Spyke, What’s Land Got To Do with It? Rhetoric and Indeterminacy in
Land’s Favored Legal Status, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 387, 420 (2004).
90. Id. at 420-21.
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that personal property does not.”91 Legally speaking, dirt is differ-
ent, and a rule that limited the Nollan/Dolan framework to physical
exactions would comport with the doctrinal distinction traditionally
made between realty and other types of property.92
Finally, such a limitation might more readily accord with Lingle’s
description of Nollan/Dolan as flowing from the doctrine of unconsti-
tutional conditions. As explained by both Nollan and Dolan, a
requirement that an owner physically dedicate a portion of land to
the public would normally trigger a categorical taking.93 Thus, with
a physical dedication, there is no doubt that compensation would
be due the owner unless the government imposes a condition that
meets the nexus and proportionality standards. By contrast, a re-
quirement that the owner pay money would not necessarily trigger
a categorical taking outside the exactions context and, accordingly,
would not fit as neatly within the doctrinal description offered by
Lingle.94
2. Similarities Between Physical and Monetary Exactions
In light of these arguments, any suggestion that the requirements
of Nollan/Dolan be applied beyond the context of physical exactions
should proceed cautiously. Nevertheless, despite the doctrinal dif-
ferences between land and money, there also are many similarities
between physical and monetary exactions. Weighing the differences
and similarities is no doubt something of a subjective task, but,
91. Id. at 423.
92. Cf. Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 637 (2004) (suggesting that extension of
Nollan/Dolan to impact fees might reveal diminished concern “for the uniqueness and
integrity of real property”). But see Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Is Land Special? The
Unjustified Preference for Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227,
232-33 (2004) (rejecting distinction between land and other forms of property for purposes of
takings analysis).
93. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483
U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
94. Similar arguments have been made by several commentators. See, e.g., DANA &
MERRILL, supra note 50, at 225-26; Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional
Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 754-55 (2007); Jacobs,
supra note 23, at 482; Daniel Pollack, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Tries To Prune
Agins Without Stepping on Nollan and Dolan, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 925, 930-31 (2006).
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ultimately, I believe that the similarities carry the day and suggest
the relevance of the Nollan/Dolan standards to monetary exactions.
Exactions of both types present special problems not found in
other land use contexts. Chief among these is the problem of lever-
aging—that is, the government exercising its monopoly power over
land use regulation to demand concessions from property owners it
otherwise would not be able to obtain.95 For example, some have
observed that local officials sometimes intentionally adopt restric-
tive zoning classifications and development standards for the
purpose of artificially strengthening their bargaining position, and
then offer to waive the restrictions in exchange for some quid pro
quo from developers.96 
This type of leveraging was a primary concern for the Court in
Nollan, providing a theoretical basis for the “essential nexus”
requirement:
One would expect that a regime in which this kind of leveraging
of the police power is allowed would produce stringent land-use
regulation which the State then waives to accomplish other
purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land-use goals
purportedly sought to be served than would result from more
lenient (but nontradeable) development restrictions. Thus, the
importance of the purpose underlying the prohibition not only
does not justify the imposition of unrelated conditions for
eliminating the prohibition, but positively militates against the
practice.97
When leveraging results in the imposition of conditions unrelated
to the interests for which the government ostensibly seeks protec-
tion, the Court noted, the condition should be viewed more as a
“plan of extortion” than a valid regulation of land use.98 Dolan
explicitly echoed this concern in discussing the nexus requirement99
and seemed to justify the additional proportionality requirement on
95. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 438-39 (Cal. 1996) (plurality opinion);
Haskins, supra note 25, at 491.
96. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 90 (2005); JOHN M. LEVY,
CONTEMPORARY URBAN PLANNING 123, 125 (6th ed. 2003).
97. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 n.5.
98. Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584 (1981)).
99. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994).
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the grounds that governments should not be able to leverage
property owners in a manner that avoided the constitutional
obligation to compensate takings of their properties.100
Although Nollan and Dolan were concerned with the potentially
extortionate nature of physical exactions, the problems posed by
improper leveraging can exist in the context of monetary exac-
tions as well.101 As Professors Ball and Reynolds have explained,
“Regardless of whether the exaction requires land or money, the
owner must provide what the government requires in order to
receive the necessary approval to develop.”102 Thus, to the extent the
government is apt to exercise its regulatory authority in an inap-
propriate manner, the distinction between physical and monetary
exactions does little to curb that impulse. Indeed, it may be that
monetary exactions present a more tempting scenario for govern-
ments to engage in leveraging. Because a fee is not tied geographi-
cally to the land under development, it can be used more flexibly to
finance a larger number of infrastructure improvements on a
system-wide basis than can the average physical exaction. These
characteristics suggest an increased incentive to leverage land use
approval in exchange for money, rather than in exchange for land
itself.103
A closely related problem is ensuring that public burdens are
properly distributed. The Supreme Court repeatedly has stressed
that one of the primary theories underlying the Takings Clause is
that it prevents the “[g]overnment from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.”104 As with the risk of improper
100. See id. at 396 (“A strong public desire to improve the public condition [will not]
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change.” (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922))).
101. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 444 (Cal. 1996) (plurality opinion)
(recognizing that some monetary exactions can pose same risk of improper leveraging as
physical exactions); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620,
639-40 (Tex. 2004) (same).
102. Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and Burden Distribution in Takings Law,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1569 (2006).
103. See Needleman, supra note 25, at 1582 (noting that fungible nature of money renders
monetary exactions “an even greater threat of government abuse”).
104. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); accord Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n,
483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987). As Professors Ball and Reynolds point out, this “is one of the few
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leveraging, the danger of forcing a select individual or group to bear
public burdens is no less present when the government attempts to
exact money than when it attempts to exact land.105 As one court
has explained, Nollan and Dolan presented a unique scenario not
only because they involved dedications of real property.106 Equally
unique was that, in each case, “the conditions required the devel-
oper to make an affirmative contribution to solve a public problem
that existed, at least in part, outside the developed property” and
which “the development did not cause [but] at most it only aggra-
vated.”107 This description fits most monetary exactions, as well,
suggesting the presence of similar issues and the need for a similar
test.108 Indeed, by definition, monetary exactions impose burdens on
one segment of society—namely, new development—to finance
public infrastructure and services used by broader segments.109
Although this characteristic by itself does not necessarily render
monetary exactions improper, it does help explain why such exac-
tions might be scrutinized similarly to physical exactions.110
In addition to these similarities in horizontal burdens—that is,
the degree to which obligations are distributed among various
concepts associated with takings law on which there seems to be a strong and ongoing
agreement among members of the Court.” See Ball & Reynolds, supra note 102, at 1535.
105. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 444 (linking monetary exactions to potential for “distributive
injustice in the allocation of civic costs”).
106. See Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 14 P.3d 172, 174 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000).
107. Id. at 174-75.
108. Id. at 175.
109. See Ball & Reynolds, supra note 102, at 1570 (“Nontax sources of revenue, by
definition, single out some owners and impose burdens on them, based on the impact of their
land use on the community.”); Nelson, supra note 8, at 548 (acknowledging that impact fees
“result in a shift in the burden of financing facilities from the public at-large to the usually
narrower base of new development”); Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 230 (recognizing criticism
that impact fees “convert zoning and land development regulation from being a harm-
preventing enterprise to one that would confer financial benefits to the existing community
by imposing common costs on the shoulders of the few”).
110. Several cases demonstrate that monetary exactions can raise the same issues of
burden distribution as physical exactions. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City
of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 994-95 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (involving water resources
development fee imposed only on new development to alleviate preexisting water shortages);
San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 91-92 (Cal. 2002) (involving fee
imposed on hotel operators to help remedy city-wide affordable housing shortage); Ehrlich,
911 P.2d at 434-35 (involving imposition of fee on single property owner to alleviate deficiency
in municipal recreational facilities).
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property owners—both types of exactions can impose serious
vertical burdens on individual property owners as well.111 To be
sure, an obligation to pay money may not affect the owner’s core
rights as immediately, and perhaps not to the same extent, as will
a physical dedication. For this reason, a monetary exaction may not
as readily fit Lingle’s “functional equivalence” standard.112 But
monetary obligations can impose considerable burdens on a property
owner, especially when those obligations are imposed as a pre-
development condition of approval and the sum requested is a
significant percentage of the value of the parcel under development. 
Exactions of either stripe are directly tied to the government’s
authority to regulate land use.113 Thus, what ultimately is at stake,
whether the exaction is monetary or physical, is the owner’s ability
to move forward with a proposed use of her real property. When this
ability is held hostage by arbitrary or excessive requirements to
dedicate money to the public—money that the government other-
wise would be unable to demand—the owner’s rights in the parcel
are affected.114 This undeniable connection between the money
requested and the parcel sought to be developed minimizes some of
the doctrinal concerns supporting the distinction between realty and
money. When a government exacts concessions from a property
owner in exchange for land use approval, whether those concessions
are in the form of money or physical dedications, land necessarily is
at issue.
Moreover, to the extent that the appropriation of money, like the
appropriation of land, can independently form the basis of a takings
claim, there seems to be little reason to create a bright-line dis-
tinction between monetary and physical exactions. The applicability
of the Takings Clause to money is not entirely settled, and a full
exposition of this issue is beyond this Article’s scope. Nonetheless,
money might qualify as “property” for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment, especially when it is directly linked to realty. As far
111. See Ball & Reynolds, supra note 102, at 1533 (describing vertical and horizontal
burdens).
112. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Waters Landing Ltd. P’ship v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712, 717 (Md.
1994) (explaining that development impact “tax” was “imposed only when the owner of land
makes a particular use of the land, i.e., develops it”).
114. Cf. Kent, supra note 28, at 90-92 (explaining how total economic deprivation can affect
core property rights even without a physical invasion).
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back as 1898, in Village of Norwood v. Baker, the Supreme Court
applied a takings analysis to an exaction of money levied against
the owner of real property.115 In Norwood, the Court affirmed the
enjoining of a special assessment against certain parcels, which
abutted a newly improved road, for the entire cost of constructing
the road.116 Acknowledging that the special assessments were a form
of taxation, the Court nevertheless held that they might come under
the strictures of the Takings Clause.117 “In our judgment,” wrote the
Court, “the exaction from the owner of private property of the cost
of a public improvement in substantial excess of the special benefits
accruing to him is, to the extent of such excess, a taking, under the
guise of taxation, of private property for public use without compen-
sation.”118 Regardless of whether Norwood continues to be a good
law,119 its suggestion that some governmental actions against money
might offend the Takings Clause has been reaffirmed on several
occasions.120
As a final matter, completely exempting monetary exactions from
the Nollan/Dolan requirements would create an exception that
115. See 172 U.S. 269, 279 (1898).
116. Id. at 293-94.
117. Id. at 279.
118. Id.
119. The precedential value of Norwood is anything but clear. Only three years after it
decided that case, the Court placed such a limiting gloss on Norwood that Justice Harlan, in
dissent, questioned whether Norwood was being overruled sub silentio. See French v. Barber
Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 344-45 (1901); see also id. at 352-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
A few years later, without a single reference to Norwood or its “substantial excess” standard,
the Court suggested that a similar road assessment needed only to be “generally fair” and do
“as nearly equal justice as can be expected,” with any resulting hardships being “borne as one
of the imperfections of human things.” See Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co.,
197 U.S. 430, 434 (1905). In 1916, however, the Court cited Norwood approvingly and applied
it to reverse a state court decision upholding an assessment that allegedly provided no benefit
to the assessed property. See Myles Salt Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 239 U.S. 478, 485 (1916).
120. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003) (acknowledging that
confiscation of account interest might be subject to categorical analysis as per se taking under
Loretto); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 529-37 (1998) (plurality opinion) (applying Penn
Central balancing to legislatively imposed monetary obligation); Phillips v. Wash. Legal
Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (holding that accrued interest on Interest on Lawyers Trust
Account accounts is property for purposes of takings analysis); Webb’s Fabulous Pharm., Inc.
v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980) (holding that confiscation of accrued interest on
interpleader funds violated Takings Clause); cf. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52,
62-63 (1989) (implicitly recognizing that excessive and unreasonable fee unrelated to cost of
government services might be a taking). But see id. at 62 n.9 (distinguishing money from “real
or personal property” because “money is fungible”).
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swallows the rule. As previously mentioned, scholars agree that
monetary exactions evolved from the types of physical dedications
at issue in Nollan and Dolan.121 This evolution is the result of local
governments looking for flexible, nontax ways to finance public
infrastructure.122 A rule that subjects physical exactions to nexus
and proportionality standards, but completely exempts monetary
exactions from the same limitations, does nothing to curtail the
problems identified in the Court’s exactions cases. On the contrary,
it creates an incentive for local governments to impose more and
larger fees on new development, notwithstanding that those fees
pose many of the same risks as the physical dedications from which
they derive. Under such a regime, a government concerned about
the prospect of having its physical exactions subjected to heightened
scrutiny could simply demand an “in lieu” fee instead—that is, a
monetary equivalent for the land subject to dedication. Thus, a
would-be dedication might avoid heightened scrutiny for no reason
other than its valuation and conversion into cash. This sort of
bright-line formalism, at least in this scenario, results in a distinc-
tion without any substantive difference.123 
C. Only Adjudicative Decisions?
In addition to the distinction between physical and monetary
exactions, many courts also have distinguished between those
exactions imposed on an individual basis via adjudicative decisions
and those that are broadly-applicable and imposed legislatively.124
121. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
122. See Ball & Reynolds, supra note 102, at 1526 (noting shift away from tax-based
financing to nontax financing).
123. Cf. Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2211
(2004) (“The distinction between the government’s demand that a citizen hand over a certain
amount of money ... and the government’s seizure of specific assets worth the same amount
of money ... seems formalistic and arbitrary.”).
124. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000
(Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (ruling Nollan/Dolan inapplicable to legislatively imposed fees); San
Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002) (limiting Nollan/Dolan
to “individualized development fees”); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687,
696 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (applying Nollan/Dolan to “adjudicatively imposed development
exactions” but not to “generally applicable, legislatively formulated fees”); Parking Ass’n of
Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 203 n.3 (Ga. 1994) (describing application of Dolan as
“misplaced” in context of “legislative determination [made] with regard to many landowners”);
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This distinction seems to be based primarily on two arguments.
First, courts have suggested that the distinction was established by
the Supreme Court itself.125 This suggestion is rooted chiefly in
Dolan’s language differentiating between “legislative determina-
tions classifying entire areas of the city” and the “adjudicative
decision” in that case “to condition petitioner’s application for a
building permit on an individual parcel.”126 Several courts have
seized upon this language to exempt legislatively-imposed exactions
of general applicability from the Nollan/Dolan requirements.127
Second, courts have reasoned that legislative exactions present
appreciably less risk of improper governmental activity than do
adjudicative exactions.128 This is so, according to at least one court,
because any problems posed by widespread, legislative exactions can
be managed effectively through the political process.129
Much of the commentary on Nollan/Dolan has rejected this
distinction between adjudicative and legislative exactions,130 and, in
Waters Landing Ltd. P’ship v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712, 724 (Md. 1994)
(distinguishing development impact tax from Dolan because tax was “imposed ... by legislative
enactment”). 
125. See, e.g., Waters Landing, 650 A.2d at 724.
126. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). Although it has not yet been as
heavily relied on by the lower courts, Lingle’s similar language would also be relevant. See
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005) (describing Nollan and Dolan as
involving “adjudicative land-use exactions”). 
127. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz., 930 P.2d at 1000; Krupp, 19 P.3d at 696;
Waters Landing, 650 A.2d at 724.
128. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz., 930 P.2d at 1000; San Remo Hotel, 41
P.3d at 105; Krupp, 19 P.3d at 696.
129. San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 105.
130. See, e.g., DANA & MERRILL, supra note 50, at 226-27; Ball & Reynolds, supra note 102,
at 1561-68; J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the “Essential Nexus”: How State and Federal
Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 373, 401-07 (2002); Haskins, supra note 25, at 501-19; Christopher T. Goodin,
Comment, Dolan v. City of Tigard and the Distinction Between Administrative and Legislative
Exactions: “A Distinction Without a Constitutional Difference,” 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 142
(2005); D.S. Pensley, Note, Real Cities, Ideal Cities: Proposing a Test of Intrinsic Fairness for
Contested Development Exactions, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 699, 704 (2006); Inna Reznick, Note,
The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 247 (2000). But see Fenster, supra note 94, at 754-55 (arguing that
applying heightened scrutiny to only individualized decisions is more consistent with Lingle);
Benjamin S. Kingsley, Making It Easy To Be Green: Using Impact Fees To Encourage Green
Building, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 532, 560-61 (2008) (asserting that “those who claim that Nollan
and Dolan do not apply to legislatively imposed monetary impact fees may have the better
argument”).
2010]   ANALYZING DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES AS TAKINGS 1861
my estimation, such a rejection is well-founded for a variety of
reasons. To begin with, I believe that lower courts have read too
much into Dolan’s explanation of the differences between adju-
dicative and legislative decisions. A close look at the opinion sug-
gests that Dolan was not differentiating between two types of
exactions. Rather, the distinction seemingly made by the Court was
between exactions on the one hand and general land use regulations
like zoning on the other. The relevant language is found in a portion
of the opinion that sought to distinguish the exactions at issue from
the context of “land use planning.”131 The latter context, the Court
explained, entails “essentially legislative determinations classifying
entire areas of the city.”132 Here, the Court seemed to have in mind
governmental actions like establishing a zoning regime or creating
a comprehensive plan—that is, decisions that set broad policy goals
on a large-scale basis. In Dolan, by contrast, the Court confronted
a different type of decision, one that conditioned the issuance of a
building permit based on an applicant’s proposal to develop her
parcel of land.133 The real distinction, therefore, seems not to be how
the conditions are created or decided upon, but whether they apply
to individual cases.
This reading of Dolan is buttressed by the case’s own factual
details. Contrary to the suggestions of many lower courts, the
exactions in Dolan were not established ad hoc in the midst of
administrative proceedings on the plaintiff’s permit application.
Quite the opposite, they were created as part of the city’s overall
development code and were already in force at the time her
application was considered.134 Moreover, rather than being limited
to the plaintiff’s particular parcel, similar conditions appear to have
been imposed on all similarly-situated land within the city.135
Accordingly, it seems as though the conditions confronting the Court
were just the sort of widely-applicable, legislatively-established
131. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384.
132. Id. at 385 (emphasis added).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 379-80 (noting that the city “granted petitioner’s permit application subject
to conditions imposed by the city’s [Commmunity Development Code]” (emphasis added)).
135. See id. (quoting portion of development code that imposed same requirements
generally on development “within and adjacent to the 100-year floodplain”); see also Ball &
Reynolds, supra note 102, at 1552 (reviewing record and asserting that Dolan was “regulated
in the same way as all others who owned properties in floodplain areas”).
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conditions that some lower courts have declared beyond reach of the
Nollan/Dolan framework.136
Perhaps more troubling, though, is that the distinction between
adjudicative and legislative exactions depends on a separation of
powers theory that has no basis in the reality of land use decision
making. Others have noted that local governments, unlike their
federal and state counterparts, often fail to adhere to any real
division between the legislative, executive, and judicial functions.137
This is especially true in the context of land use regulation, where
almost every decision tends to have both legislative and adjudicative
characteristics.138 All land use decisions are rooted ultimately in
legislative authority and seek to promote legislatively-determined
goals.139 Likewise, every land use regulation ultimately must apply
to individual parcels in specific factual contexts.140 As a practical
matter, the line between legislative and adjudicative actions simply
cannot be drawn with precision.
This lack of precision is exemplified by a number of state court
cases considering challenges to exactions. In Krupp v. Breckenridge
Sanitation District, for example, the court formalistically labeled as
legislative, and therefore exempt from Nollan/Dolan, a development
fee established by the local governing board pursuant to a published
schedule, even though the schedule did not include the type of
development at issue and the fee in actuality had been calculated at
the discretion of the district manager.141 In another case, Dudek v.
Umatilla County, the court adhered to the legislative/adjudicative
distinction in reciting the relevant legal standard, but then sub-
jected a legislatively-imposed exaction to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny on
the grounds that the exaction’s applicability depended on a number
136. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 413 n.* (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for
characterizing conditions as adjudicative); Ball & Reynolds, supra note 102, at 1563
(commenting that “the city’s exaction formula in Dolan appears no more ‘adjudicative’ than
the typical formulas labeled as ‘legislative’ by lower courts”).
137. See, e.g., Ball & Reynolds, supra note 102, at 1562; Breemer, supra note 130, at 405-
06; Pensley, supra note 130, at 709-10; Reznick, supra note 130, at 260.
138. See Breemer, supra note 130, at 405-06.
139. See PETER W. SALSICH, JR. & TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULATION 3 (2d ed.
2003) (noting that “authority to regulate the use and development of land is derived from the
police power”); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (explaining that the
exercise of police power is a legislative function).
140. Ball & Reynolds, supra note 102, at 1563.
141. 19 P.3d 687, 691, 696 (Colo. 2001) (en banc).
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of decisions particular to each individual case.142 Finally, in Town
of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. Partnership, the court
refused to adopt the distinction even though the exaction at issue
was imposed legislatively because the town was authorized to, and
in fact did, grant exceptions in certain circumstances.143 These cases
teach that a bright-line distinction between adjudicative and
legislative exactions rarely exists in reality and, for that reason,
should not determine the appropriate analytical standard.
As a final matter, the adjudicative/legislative distinction does
little to alleviate concerns about leveraging, burden distribution,
and unconstitutional conditions. Although some courts have sug-
gested that there is little or no risk of these problems when an
exaction is imposed legislatively,144 this suggestion seems naïve.
Many others have made the point, and it need not be belabored
here, that legislative actions can pose the same threats of extortion,
inappropriate allocation of burdens, and damage to property rights
as adjudicative actions.145 This possibility is magnified in local
politics. Because elected officials at the local level work in much
greater proximity to their constituents than do legislators at higher
levels, local officials tend to reflect in larger measure the concerns
and biases of those voting for them.146 To be sure, proximity to the
electorate can produce certain advantages. Inasmuch as the polit-
ical units involved are generally small and localized, they have
been viewed as more responsive to the needs of their constituents
than the federal or state governments.147 As explained by Professor
Fischel’s “homevoter hypothesis,” local decision making has greater
influence on home values, resulting in greater participation by
homeowners in local government, which in turn produces more
142. 69 P.3d 751, 756 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
143. 135 S.W.3d 620, 641-42 (Tex. 2004).
144. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Goodin, supra note 130, at 162-63; Reznick, supra note 130, at 270; see also
Parking Ass’n of Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117-18 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (“A city council can take property just as well as a planning
commission can.”). Moreover, inasmuch as no legislative action exemption has been created
for other applications of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see Breemer, supra note 130,
at 402, it is difficult to understand why such an exemption should exist under the Takings
Clause.
146. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How
Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 929, 930.
147. See, e.g., id. at 930-31.
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efficient governmental action.148 But these very features can pro-
duce negative results as well, especially when it comes to land use
policy.149 The small and insular nature of local governments in-
creases the potential that local prejudices may go unchecked for lack
of a sufficiently strong countervailing interest. In its worst form,
these shared values can turn into a majoritarian tyranny of the sort
famously warned against by James Madison.150 Thus, there exists
a real danger that the political process will fail to protect against
inordinate exactions, legislative as well as adjudicative, especially
when those exactions are paid primarily by new development that
not only is unpopular with existing residents but is sought by
outsiders with little or no political voice.151 As explained by one
court, it is “entirely possible that the government could ‘gang up’ on
particular groups to force extractions that a majority of constituents
would not only tolerate but applaud, so long as burdens they would
otherwise bear were shifted to others.”152 If remedying this sort of
148. See id. at 931 (summarizing the “homevoter hypothesis”).
149. See id. at 930 (“Zoning serves the interests of a majority of local voters, most of whom
are homeowners, and zoning’s excesses must be laid at their doorstep.”).
150. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001) (“When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular
government ... enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and
the rights of other citizens.”); see also id. at 47-48 (“[T]he smaller the number of individuals
composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more
easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.”). Numerous scholars have
noted the connections between Madison’s arguments in The Federalist No. 10 and local land-
use regulation. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 405-07 (1977); Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land
Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1499 (2008); John M. Payne, Politics,
Exclusionary Zoning and Robert Wilentz, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 689, 706 (1997); Stewart E.
Sterk, The Inevitable Failure of Nuisance-Based Theories of the Takings Clause: A Reply to
Professor Claeys, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 231, 241 (2004).
151. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 208-09 (“By adopting ordinances embracing
development impact fee regimes, local governments simultaneously achieve a series of
attractive political objectives, and they do so without having to consider any potential
objections from interest groups unrepresented in the existing voting populace.”). Professor
Fenster argues that the entire Nollan/Dolan framework weakens the local political climate
but suggests that this is especially true where legislative exactions are exempted from that
framework. In such circumstances, “local governments have even stronger incentives to avoid
bargaining and individualized conditions,” relying instead on “preconstituted formulas” that
“are inevitably safer and more attractive ... than are open-ended political contests, with their
attendant political compromises.” See Fenster, supra note 92, at 669.
152. Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 641 (Tex.
2004).
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process failure was the original purpose of the Takings Clause, as
some have argued,153 then there seems to be no reason to exempt
legislative exactions from the scrutiny applied to adjudicative ones.
III. CLASSIFYING IMPACT FEES
For the reasons given above, I agree that the constitutional
definition of “exaction” should “move beyond the legislative-adju-
dicative and land-monetary distinctions.”154 Because monetary and
legislative exactions often pose the same threats as adjudicative
demands for physical dedications, such formalistic, bright-line div-
isions seem to be misplaced. But simply doing away with those
distinctions does not necessarily put development impact fees
within the Nollan/Dolan framework. Impact fees share charac-
teristics not only with physical exactions but also with municipal
financing devices like taxes, which often are considered to be outside
the bounds of, or at least not as offensive to, the Takings Clause.155
For this reason, even if Nollan/Dolan applies to some types of
monetary exactions, such as “in lieu” fees, that framework might be
less appropriate for impact fees because of their tax-like qualities.156
In local finance law, where labels often have decisive effect on
whether a particular practice is legal,157 it is first necessary to
classify impact fees before deciding whether and how the nexus and
proportionality standards should apply.
153. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 855 (1995).
154. Ball & Reynolds, supra note 102, at 1560.
155. See Peñalver, supra note 123, at 2217.
156. This is not to say that only impact fees share qualities with taxation. Professor
Peñalver demonstrates that, under certain theories, even physical exactions might be
considered taxes and, therefore, subjected to lower Takings Clause scrutiny. See id. at 2217-
18. But their monetary nature and their easier use in financing system-wide infrastructure
makes the similarities between impact fees and taxes more striking.
157. See, e.g., Waters Landing Ltd. P’ship v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712, 714-16
(Md. 1994) (affirming validity of development impact “tax” that was virtually identical to
development impact “fee” invalidated four years earlier).
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158. Jordan v. Hyatt, 3 Barb. 275, 282 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1848).
159. People ex rel. Griffin v. Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419, 422 (1851).
160. City of St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo. 122, 124 (1872).
A. Of Taxes and Takings
Before discussing how impact fees compare with other mecha-
nisms, however, it is important to consider some of the theoretical
and doctrinal friction that exists between the law of takings and the
government’s power to levy taxes. On one level, there seems to be a
fundamental connection between taking a citizen’s property for
public use and taking his money to pay for public expenses. Both
takings and taxes force the citizen to part with something that
belongs to him, and both do so ostensibly for the good of the
commonwealth. 
These parallels did not escape the attention of earlier American
courts, as evidenced by several nineteenth-century decisions. One
New York judge, for example, noted the difficulty in “draw[ing] the
dividing line, between that taking of private property for public use
which falls within the legitimate exercise of the taxing power, and
that which requires a just compensation, within the meaning of
the constitution.”158 A contemporary agreed, noting that “[t]he right
of taxation and the right of eminent domain rest substantially on
the same foundation.”159 A later Missouri court straightforwardly
applied the principles of public use and just compensation as “[t]he
proper construction of the constitution in regard to taxing private
property.”160 
Whichever power was utilized, these courts suggested that the
owner or payer had to receive some type of recompense for the
forced transfer of his property. The Supreme Court of Utah ex-
plained:
When the property is taken under the right of eminent domain
the public pays the owner in money; when money is exacted by
means of a special assessment the owners are compensated in
special benefits to their property by public improvements made
in its expenditure; and when money is exacted by a general tax
the payer is compensated in the benefits received from the
government in any and all of the ways that a government may
benefit society. Thus the individual is compensated for the
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161. Territory v. Daniels, 22 P. 159, 162 (Utah 1889); accord Griffin, 4 N.Y. at 422-23.
162. William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 571
(1972).
163. See, e.g., Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82, 95 (1859) (holding that taxes levied against land
recently annexed into a city were uncompensated taking of property where city services
brought no real benefit).
164. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819).
165. County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 703 (1880).
166. See supra note 119; see also Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 265
(1915) (noting that “there is no requirement of the Federal Constitution that for every
payment there must be an equal benefit,” and declaring that a special assessment violates the
Constitution only where “the exaction is a flagrant abuse, and by reason of its arbitrary
character is mere confiscation of particular property”).
167. See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916). For a discussion of
Brushaber, including the narrow application of the tax at issue, see Peñalver, supra note 123,
at 2200-01 & n.80. 
property he parts with, whether it consists of lands or money or
other property.161
When viewed in this theoretical light, taxes and takings are not
merely similar animals, they are “the same, as far as the [govern-
ment’s] power itself goes.”162
From a doctrinal standpoint, however, taxes and takings gen-
erally are compartmentalized and run in very different analytical
circles. Although several early courts applied takings principles to
limit taxation,163 several others suggested that the power of taxation
largely, if not entirely, exists outside the realm of Takings Clause
inquiry. In one of the earliest and most famous explications of the
taxing power, Chief Justice Marshall declared that “[t]he only
security against [its] abuse ... is found in the structure of the
government itself.”164 Sixty years later, the Supreme Court seem-
ingly reaffirmed this proposition, stating that “taxation for a public
purpose, however great, [is not] the taking of private property for
public use, in the sense of the Constitution.”165 Subsequent decisions
concerning special assessments and tax districts generally reveal a
similar, albeit somewhat schizophrenic, position.166 Likewise, the
Court has long upheld progressive income taxes against claims that
the taxes were confiscatory, even taxes that burdened as few as 4
percent of the population to pay for widespread government
services.167 Perhaps most telling, the Court also has upheld in-kind
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taxes, in which the government requires payment in specific
property rather than in money.168
Courts and commentators of more recent vintage have made
similar doctrinal distinctions between takings and taxes, despite the
theoretical similarities between them.169 Under this view, even if
police power regulations might amount to an uncompensated taking
of property, taxes ordinarily will not unless they are levied in an
arbitrary or abusive manner. Thus, classifying development impact
fees as taxes conceivably might insulate them from any meaningful
scrutiny under the Takings Clause, much less the heightened
scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan. For this reason, in the context of takings
challenges, the proper classification of impact fees is of utmost
significance to determine the appropriate framework.
B. Fees or Taxes?
Unfortunately, classifying impact fees is no easy task. Although
they share characteristics with both of the leading categories of
financing mechanisms available to local governments, they fail to fit
perfectly into either category. To better understand the conundrum
presented by impact fees, it proves helpful to review briefly the
distinctive characteristics of these financing options and then to
evaluate how impact fees match those characteristics.
When determining how to pay for projects or services, local
governments generally can choose between two broad categories:
168. See Leonard v. Earle, 279 U.S. 392, 396-98 (1929); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71,
77-78 (1868).
169. See, e.g., Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Wash. County, 45 P.3d 966, 971 (Or. Ct. App. 2002)
(“Respondents are correct that, generally, the Takings Clause does not apply to taxes.”);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 980-81
(2000) (“The implicit understanding has always been that the Takings Clause has no
application to legislation that imposes taxes or allocates government spending.”). Drawing
such distinctions is by no means a universal practice, however. See Abram v. City of Avon
Lake, 904 N.E.2d 612, 616-18 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (noting that levy of special assessment in
excess of benefits received by property owner constitutes “unjust taking of private property
for public use without compensation,” and reversing summary judgment because evidence
created fact issue as to excess); Eric Kades, Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The
Continuous Burdens Principle, and Its Broader Application, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 189, 190 (2002)
(“[T]he notion that taxes are never takings is inconsistent with foundational takings law; the
label ‘tax’ confers no immunity to the principles of the Takings Clause.”); Peñalver, supra note
123, at 2240-51 (noting similarities and arguing that consensus about taxes should be used
as framework to narrow the law of takings).
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taxes or fees. A tax may be defined as an all-purpose, revenue-
raising measure assessed broadly throughout the taxing jurisdiction
to finance any governmental function, regardless of the connection
between the charge and the benefits received by the person paying
it.170 Fees, on the other hand, usually are imposed pursuant to the
police power on smaller subsets of the taxing population, and they
find their justification in the relationship between the payer and
the purpose for which the fee is imposed.171 This category includes
a number of different devices, such as user fees, regulatory fees, and
special assessments.172 Regardless of their exact form, fees are
characterized by their imposition on persons or groups that consume
particular government services, receive special government benefits,
or impose unique externalities that the fees are designed to repay.173
Thus, in simplest terms, what distinguishes a fee from a tax is that,
170. Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay For”
Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 379 (2004); Hugh D. Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees:
A Curious Confusion, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 337-40 (2003); see also McCarthy v. City of
Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (describing tax as “a forced contribution to raise
revenue for the maintenance of governmental services offered to the general public” (quoting
Executive Aircraft Consulting, Inc. v. City of Newton, 845 P.2d 57, 62 (Kan. 1993))).
171. Reynolds, supra note 170, at 380. Professor Reynolds labels these devices “dues,”
rather than “fees.” Id.
172. See id. at 381; Spitzer, supra note 170, at 343-51. User fees are “charges levied by the
government in exchange for citizen use of government services or property,” Reynolds, supra
note 170, at 407, and include things like bridge tolls, sewer connection charges, and
wastewater management rates. See Haw. Insurers Council v. Lingle, 201 P.3d 564, 573 (Haw.
2008). Regulatory fees, on the other hand, “are based more broadly on the government’s police
powers and are imposed on a regulated individual, entity, property, or business in order to
offset the cost of the regulation.” Reynolds, supra note 170, at 407. These fees traditionally
are understood to cover the government’s outlays in processing applications, administering
licenses and permits, conducting inspections, and similar regulatory activities. See Spitzer,
supra note 170, at 352. Finally, special assessments are charges “imposed on owners of
property to finance improvements or services directly benefitting that property.” Rogers
Mach., Inc. v. Wash. County, 45 P.3d 966, 972 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Auto. Club v.
State, 840 P.2d 674, 678 (Or. 1992)). Whether special assessments are levied under the taxing
power or the police power remains a source of debate. Compare, e.g., id. (noting that special
assessments traditionally are justified under the police power), with Collister v. Kovanda, 199
N.E. 477, 479 (Ohio Ct. App. 1935) (suggesting that special assessments are levied under the
taxing authority).
173. Spitzer, supra note 170, at 343; see also McCarthy, 894 P.2d at 845 (describing fee as
“a means of compensating the government for the cost of offering and regulating [a] special
service, benefit, or privilege” (quoting Executive Aircraft, 845 P.2d at 62)).
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with the former, those who pay are entitled to benefit directly from
their payment in a way that nonpayers do not.174
As suggested, fitting impact fees into this dichotomy proves to
be something of a challenge. To begin with, despite their formal
appellation, impact fees fail neatly to adhere to several of the legal
requirements for a “fee.” Although the courts have formulated var-
ious tests to determine whether a particular charge qualifies as a
fee, a review of the case law reveals several elements that receive
frequent mention. Regardless of the type of fee at issue, the charge
usually must: (1) be imposed on a person or thing directly benefit-
ting in a special way from, or imposing unique burdens on, the
service or project being funded; (2) bear some proportionality to the
benefit being provided or the burden being abated; and (3) be used
to defray the costs of conferring the benefit or minimizing the harm,
rather than for general financing purposes.175
Measuring impact fees against these criteria yields mixed results.
In fact, it is not clear that impact fees can satisfy even the first
standard. Most impact fees are used to pay for improvements to
public services and infrastructure, such as roads, schools, water and
sewer systems, fire protection, and public safety. Because these
improvements keep the system from becoming unduly congested,
the fee payer clearly does receive some benefit from updated and
expanded infrastructure. But unless use of the new infrastructure
is limited to the new development paying for it, similar benefits
accrue to all of the other residents in the jurisdiction as well. As
such, it often is difficult to conclude with any legitimacy that the
174. Reynolds, supra note 170, at 382; see also Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond
Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 135 (Fla. 2000) (requiring that a fee confer special benefit on the
payer “in a manner not shared by those not paying the fee” (quoting Collier County v. State,
733 So. 2d 1012, 1019 (Fla. 1999))).
175. See, e.g., Volusia County, 760 So. 2d at 135 (general fee); Haw. Insurers Council, 201
P.3d at 578 (regulatory fee); State v. Medeiros, 973 P.2d 736, 742 (Haw. 1999) (user fee);
Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Des Moines v. City of W. Des Moines, 644 N.W.2d 339, 347-48
(Iowa 2002) (general fee); McCarthy, 894 P.2d at 845-46 (general fee); Waters Landing Ltd.
P’ship v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712, 723-24 (Md. 1994) (special assessment); Emerson
Coll. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105-06 (Mass. 1984) (general fee); Johnson v. City
of Eagan, 584 N.W.2d 770, 771-72 (Minn. 1998) (special assessment); City of Ocean Springs
v. Homebuilders Ass’n of Miss., Inc., 932 So. 2d 44, 55 (Miss. 2006) (regulatory fee); Rogers
Mach., 45 P.3d at 972 (special assessment); Covell v. City of Seattle, 905 P.2d 324, 327 (Wash.
1995) (general fee).
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new development paying the impact fee is benefitted in a special
way that is not enjoyed by nonpayers.176
To get around this problem, several courts have sought to uphold
impact fees on the basis that new development imposes unique
burdens on existing infrastructure, directly resulting in the need for
additional facilities and services.177 Under this theory, only new
development need pay the fees because “the facilities would not
have to expand but for new development.”178 In my estimation, this
theory overstates its case. Although new development almost
certainly adds some burden to governmental systems, this theory
ignores the complexity underlying the causes for new services and
projects.
Professor Reynolds, for example, identifies several other factors
that contribute to the need for service and infrastructure improve-
ments, such as deterioration of existing facilities, increases in the
community’s standard of living, demographic changes, more restric-
tive construction standards, and changes in resident behavior.179
Several cases support her conclusion that local governments too
often consider only new development without accounting for these
other contributors.180 Thus, whether one looks at benefits or bur-
dens, it is not always apparent that the new development paying the
impact fee is specially situated vis-à-vis the remaining community.
Many of these same problems also prevent impact fees, at least
as currently configured, from easily satisfying the second criteria:
a proportional connection between the charge and the benefits or
burdens at issue. Obviously, the difficulty in accurately distinguish-
ing the benefits and burdens attributable to new development
makes attempts at proportionality challenging, though not impossi-
176. See, e.g., Collier County, 733 So. 2d at 1019 (holding that governmental services fee
was invalid because “the services to be funded by the fee are the same general police-power
services provided to all County residents”); Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Des Moines, 644
N.W.2d at 348-49 (holding that impact fee for neighborhood park could not be justified on
basis of special benefits provided to those paying it); Ocean Springs, 932 So. 2d at 55-56
(holding that impact fees used for fire protection services, park and recreation purposes, and
general municipal services were invalid due to lack of special benefit to those paying fees).
177. See, e.g., Loyola Marymount Univ. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424, 429-
30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 394
n.3 (Ill. 1995).
178. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 353.
179. Reynolds, supra note 170, at 395 n.99, 435-36.
180. See supra note 110.
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ble.181 Perhaps more troubling is that impact fees often fail to
account both for past and future infusions of capital into the system.
Where the original facilities were financed through generally
applicable taxes or federal grants, but later facilities are financed
through impact fees paid only by new development, the cost of
financing the overall system falls disproportionately on new
development, while existing users receive a disproportionate
benefit.182 This lack of proportionality becomes even greater when
one considers that the maintenance of the system probably will be
financed via user fees or general taxes, paid by both new develop-
ment and existing residents and used initially to maintain the older
facilities.183
Finally, it often is difficult to determine with confidence whether
impact fees really are being used to defray the costs of conferring
benefits or abating harms, as opposed to being simple revenue-
raising devices. There is no doubt that new development usually
imposes costs on local government, both from an administrative and
level-of-service standpoint. Thus, to some degree, impact fees do
help pay for the costs connected to the regulatory system governing
land use. On the other hand, as noted by courts and commentators
alike, the services and projects financed by impact fees are the very
types of services and projects traditionally financed through general
tax revenues.184 As such, they resemble general revenue-raising
measures, a characteristic that traditionally has been considered
incompatible with a “fee.”185
181. Note that proportionality is concerned with who uses or causes what improvements.
While complex, these figures can be calculated with some degree of confidence, for example,
by traffic studies demonstrating how many trips per day are generated by different land uses
along different types of roads. This is a separate inquiry from whether new development
receives special benefits or imposes special burdens. Indeed, it may be that the more accurate
the proportionality of a fee—the more it takes into account the various users of and causes
for public facilities—the less special any single user or cause will appear.
182. See Reynolds, supra note 170, at 436.
183. See id. at 436-37.
184. See, e.g., City of Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders Ass’n of Miss., Inc., 932 So. 2d 44, 56
(Miss. 2006); Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 208.
185. See, e.g., McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (“‘A fee is not
a revenue measure.’” (quoting Executive Aircraft Consulting, Inc. v. City of Newton, 845 P.2d
57, 62 (Kan. 1993))); Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Minn. 1997)
(“When it has been apparent that a city’s true motivation was to raise revenue ... we have
disregarded the fee label ... and held that the charge in question was in fact a tax.”). 
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Thus far, impact fees do not appear to be true “fees,” suggesting
instead that they are more properly classified as taxes. This
conclusion could have great significance for how impact fees fare
when challenged under the Takings Clause, and it might very well
justify treating impact fees differently than physical exactions or “in
lieu” fees. The problem, however, is that impact fees do not neatly
fit the legal requirements for a tax either.
To be sure, inasmuch as one of the chief purposes of impact fees
is to raise revenue, they resemble taxes.186 But they often fail to
comply with one of the leading limitations on taxation, the “nearly
universal state law requirement” that taxes be uniform.187 The
uniformity principle generally requires “that classifications of
taxpayers must be reasonable and that treatment of taxpayers
within classes must be equal.”188 The same issues that prevent easy
classification of impact fees as “fees” create trouble under the
uniformity principle as well. To the extent that impact fees are
levied against only new development, but pay for improvements
that are used by the community at large, it is difficult to say they
are applied uniformly.189 Indeed, this lack of uniformity is tacitly
conceded by those asserting that new development is the “but for”
cause of the improvements. Additionally, the proportionality
problems resulting from the mix of past and future financing also
create uniformity problems if the fee is viewed as a tax. As one
judge explained in commenting on a transportation impact fee:
Most of the existing infrastructure in [our] cities and towns was
paid for by the city or town. Here, however, [the city] is attempt-
ing to force developers to pay for improvements or additions to
186. See Country Joe, 560 N.W.2d at 686 (concluding that a road unit connection charge
was a tax rather than a fee because it was “a revenue measure”); New Castle Invs. v. City of
LaCenter, 989 P.2d 569, 574 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that the purpose of a transpor-
tation impact fee was “to finance public facilities and system improvements, in other words,
to raise revenue”).
187. Reynolds, supra note 170, at 383; see also id. at nn.46-48 (citing authority).
188. Id. at 383.
189. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. N.Y. v. County of Onondaga, 573 N.Y.S.2d 863,
865 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (concluding that sewer impact fee was a nonuniform tax); Bldg.
Indus. Ass’n of Cleveland v. City of Westlake, 660 N.E.2d 501, 506 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that an impact fee used to finance improvements to existing recreational facilities
was a nonuniform tax in violation of Equal Protection Clause and state constitution’s
uniformity clause).
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infrastructure as a quid pro quo for developing a site, even when
the improvements or additions occur beyond the property lines
of the development. This strikes me as a tax, and, since it is not
applied uniformly, as an unconstitutional tax.190
Some courts have sought to sidestep the uniformity problem by
equating impact fees with excise taxes—that is, taxes imposed on a
particular occupation, use, privilege, or activity—here, the develop-
ment of land.191 Such labeling may work in some jurisdictions,
where excise taxes are exempted from the uniformity require-
ment.192 But labeling provides little help in jurisdictions where
uniformity is required of excise taxes along with other types of
taxation.193 Moreover, the analogy between excise taxes and impact
fees is not a perfect fit. Excise taxes traditionally have been
calculated based on the amount of business conducted by, or the
extent of the privileges conferred on, the taxpayer.194 Impact fees, on
the other hand, are levied ostensibly as compensation for services
rendered and, therefore, are calculated based on the cost of addi-
tional infrastructure and services purportedly necessitated by new
development.195 A related point of distinction is that excise taxes
are purely revenue-raising measures for the benefit of society
generally, whereas impact fees usually are justified as police power
regulations designed to alleviate societal burdens.196 Finally, as a
190. Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d
349, 358-59 (Ohio 2000) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
191. See, e.g., Wellington River Hollow, LLC v. King County, 54 P.3d 213, 220-21 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2002).
192. See id. at 220.
193. See, e.g., Lake Lanier Theatres v. Hall County, 189 S.E.2d 439, 440 (Ga. 1972)
(explaining that uniformity principle applies “to subjects of taxation other than property” and
requires “that if one kind of business, privilege, franchise, right, etc., is taxed, the tax shall
be uniform upon all of those who engage in that business”); Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,
196 A.2d 664, 666 (Pa. 1964) (holding that uniformity principle applies to all taxes, including
excise taxes).
194. See, e.g., Harbour Vill. Apartments v. City of Mukilteo, 989 P.2d 542, 546-47 (Wash.
1999) (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
195. Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Minn. 1997).
196. See Robert H. Freilich & S. Mark White, Transportation Congestion and Growth
Management: Comprehensive Approaches To Resolving America’s Major Quality of Life Crisis,
24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 915, 933-34 (1991) (distinguishing impact fees and excise taxes); see also
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 353 (“[R]equirements to prohibit negative
externalities ... are considered to be regulatory under the police power to protect the public
while requirements to create social benefits are seen as taxation to benefit the public.”).
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taxing measure, excise taxes must be specifically authorized.197
Impact fees, by contrast, have been upheld in some states without
express enabling legislation.198
To summarize, impact fees cannot definitively be labeled either
“fees” or “taxes.” Like fees, they usually are justified pursuant to
the government’s regulatory authority over land use and seek to
recover, in some degree, the costs of providing services to new devel-
opment. Unlike traditional fees, however, it is difficult to determine
whether the payers actually receive any unique benefits or impose
any special burdens with which the fees are associated. Similarly,
impact fees often have a disproportionate effect in favor of existing
residents, and they often pay for general services rather than
services directly connected to regulation of the land under develop-
ment.199 For this reason, impact fees have a general revenue-raising
quality that makes them look like taxes.200 Unlike most taxes,
however, they are not applied uniformly and are not usually
justified under the jurisdiction’s taxing authority. In short, impact
fees possess characteristics of both a fee and a tax and, thus, have
a “hybrid quality” suggestive of both devices.201
IV. ARTICULATING THE APPROPRIATE TEST
The foregoing discussions demonstrate why takings challenges to
development impact fees pose analytical difficulties. On the one
hand, as monetary exactions, impact fees do not fit as neatly within
the Supreme Court’s doctrinal pronouncements about regulatory
takings—specifically, those related to the “functional equivalence”
standard and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions—as do
physical dedications. Likewise, because they involve money, impact
fees look different than regulatory actions that directly affect land
and its favored status in the law. At the same time, however, impact
197. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Des Moines v. City of W. Des Moines, 644
N.W.2d 339, 347 (Iowa 2002).
198. See, e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 609-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding impact fees implicitly authorized under county’s home rule authority);
Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349,
353 (Ohio 2000) (holding impact fees implicitly authorized under city’s home rule authority).
199. See Reynolds, supra note 170, at 437.
200. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
201. Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Wash. County, 45 P.3d 966, 972 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
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fees are undeniably linked to the use of real property, and they pose
many of the same risks of leveraging and improper burden distribu-
tion as do physical exactions. In addition to these tensions, impact
fees avoid easy classification from a financing standpoint, sharing
characteristics with both regulatory fees and taxes but not fitting
either category with precision. Impact fees thus occupy a space at
the theoretical and doctrinal crossroads of several different areas of
law. They are hybrid animals that do not quite comport with the
existing legal taxonomies.
For this reason, it may be best not to pigeonhole the analysis of
impact fees into either of the formal frameworks established in
the Court’s takings jurisprudence. Because impact fees are hybrid
animals, a hybrid analysis may be more appropriate. Therefore, at
the risk of adding to the regulatory takings muddle, I propose that
takings challenges to impact fees be analyzed under a framework
that combines the factor-balancing of Penn Central with the nexus
and proportionality standards of Nollan/Dolan.
A. Benefits of a Hybrid Approach 
Before discussing the particulars of this hybrid framework, it
might prove useful to examine its benefits. As an initial matter, this
proposal helps to preserve Lingle’s doctrinal focus on “functional
equivalence” and unconstitutional conditions. The analytical frame-
works established by Lingle and its forerunners seek to identify
those regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to a direct
appropriation of property by the government.202 Primarily, that
identification is based upon the effects the challenged regulation has
on the owner’s core property rights.203 The two categorical examples
of regulatory takings staked out by Lingle—that is, permanent
physical invasions and total economic deprivations—receive such
categorical treatment precisely because they impose severe conse-
quences on these rights.204 Because both Nollan and Dolan involved
a regulatory demand for a permanent easement, the exactions
analysis established by those cases can be viewed in the same light.
202. See supra notes 31, 84 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 31, 85 and accompanying text.
204. See Kent, supra note 28, at 89-92.
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When the government fails to show that the required dedication
satisfies the requirements of nexus and proportionality, we are left
with a garden-variety occupation of property that categorically
amounts to a taking because it operates on the owner’s core rights
in the same manner as does a direct appropriation.205 For this
reason, a governmental demand of this type necessarily entitles the
owner to just compensation, and he may not be required to give up
his entitlement simply to obtain discretionary approval for a land
use project. Thus, when confined to the physical exactions at issue
in those cases, the Nollan/Dolan framework fits within Lingle’s
doctrinal pronouncements.
The same cannot be said with regard to impact fees, however.
Impact fees do not require a permanent physical occupation of land,
nor do they normally result in a total economic deprivation of the
parcel under development. Therefore, unlike the exactions at issue
in Nollan and Dolan, impact fees cannot automatically be viewed
as categorical takings even absent nexus and proportionality.
Nor can it be presumed that the landowner having to pay an
impact fee necessarily is entitled to just compensation without
nexus and proportionality being satisfied. Accordingly, applying the
full Nollan/Dolan framework to impact fees would undermine some
of the doctrinal consistency achieved by Lingle. In short, impact fees
do not clearly qualify as takings in the same way as do physical
exactions or total deprivations, and therefore, they need to be
evaluated by how closely they resemble those two categories of
regulatory action. Under Lingle, such an inquiry is determined not
by the heightened scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan but by the balancing
test established in Penn Central.206
Nonetheless, the more deferential Penn Central approach, at least
as explained by the Court so far, does not adequately consider
the dangers of improper leveraging and burden distribution that
arise in the exaction context. Thus, a second advantage of a hybrid
analysis—that is, one that incorporates nexus and proportionality
into the balancing—is to guard property owners from the very
dangers with which the Court was concerned in Nollan and Dolan.
205. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994) (“The absence of a nexus ...
converted a valid regulation of land use into ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’” (quoting
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987))).
206. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005).
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Because these dangers might exist regardless of whether the
government is demanding land or money, a hybrid framework better
comports with the theoretical bases underlying Nollan and Dolan
than does the Penn Central approach by itself.
Third, a hybrid framework better accounts for the complex nature
of impact fees as a municipal financing mechanism. To the extent
that impact fees resemble true regulatory fees enacted pursuant to
the government’s police power, they should be subjected to takings
scrutiny in similar fashion to other police power regulations. This
includes evaluation of nexus and proportionality, which the Court
designed to ferret out improper leveraging and burden distribution
in the context of land use exactions. On the other hand, to the
extent they resemble general revenue taxation, it seems doctrinally
fitting that impact fees receive a lower level of scrutiny than that
established by Nollan/Dolan.
Finally, a framework that blends the factor-balancing of Penn
Central with the nexus and proportionality considerations of
Nollan/Dolan has the advantage of relying on established and
familiar, if not entirely clear,207 concepts. In this way, the progress
made by Lingle toward establishing some clarity and consistency in
the Court’s takings jurisprudence might be preserved. This is not to
say that the Court’s current view of takings is completely without
problems, and, admittedly, whether retention of the current con-
cepts amounts to a virtue rests to some degree in the eye of the
beholder. Takings law may well be in need of a complete overhaul.
The Court’s own struggles in this area, however, suggest that any
such undertaking be conducted with the greatest of prudence.
Moreover, for better or worse, the Lingle Court unanimously upheld
the existing concepts, and they are known, if not completely com-
prehended, by practitioners and lower court judges.208 For these
reasons, in an area of the law that has seen more than its share of
volatility over the past three decades, I believe that preservation of
the concepts approved in Lingle may be the better part of valor, for
the time being.
207. The Court itself has acknowledged that the Penn Central factors, for example, have
“given rise to vexing subsidiary questions.” Id. at 539. As intimated below, the Court has yet
to provide clear answers to some of these questions. See infra note 213.
208. See supra notes 5-6.
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B. Mechanics of a Hybrid Approach
Having explained some of the benefits of a hybrid analysis, we
can turn our attention toward the mechanics of how this analysis
might work. The foundation of this approach is the Penn Central
factors.209 Despite conventional wisdom, I understand Penn Central
as establishing two, rather than three, factors for consideration. The
first factor examines the regulation’s economic impact on the party
bringing the takings challenge, and this impact is measured in some
degree by “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
[that party’s] distinct investment-backed expectations.”210 Else-
where, I have explained my belief that this factor seeks to evaluate
the severity of the economic harm suffered by the property owner in
light of her own subjective circumstances vis-à-vis the property in
question, as well as the objective reasonableness of the remaining
value of the parcel after regulation, especially the ability to turn a
reasonable profit.211 When analyzing takings challenges to impact
fees, I see no reason why this factor should operate any differently.
Thus, the more substantial the harm suffered by the property owner
in paying the fee, considering both the unique characteristics of her
particular investment and the objective consequence of the fee on
value and profits, the more an impact fee will look like a taking of
property. Conversely, the slighter the economic impact, so mea-
sured, the more this factor will favor the government.
Balanced alongside the economic impact of the fee is “the ‘charac-
ter of the governmental action’”212—that is, the nature of the impact
fee being imposed on the property owner. It is here that my proposal
produces a slight change in the way the balancing works. As
currently explained by the Court, I believe that the character factor
normally seeks to determine how similar the regulation is in its
effects to a physical invasion or occupation of property by the
209. This assumes, of course, what has been stated already—that is, that the impact fee
being challenged neither requires a permanent physical invasion nor results in a total
economic deprivation. Because most impact fees will not trigger either of those categories,
Penn Central would form the heart of the analysis under the standard framework discussed
earlier in this article. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
210. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
211. See Kent, supra note 28, at 97-99.
212. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
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government.213 When analyzing a takings challenge to impact fees,
however, I think the character factor should focus chiefly on the
similarities of the fee to the physical exactions at issue in Nollan
and Dolan. Given that both physical and monetary exactions
present a unique danger of improper leveraging and burden
distribution, these dangers are the issues the analysis primarily
should seek to address. 
In the context of impact fees, then, the character factor of Penn
Central should concentrate on the nexus and proportionality
standards established by the Court’s exaction cases. Thus, the
inquiry would evaluate whether an “essential nexus” exists between
the impact fee and the stated interests used by the government to
justify that fee.214 As with Nollan/Dolan, the legitimacy or reason-
ableness of the interest advanced by the government should be
assumed.215 Additionally, this inquiry would include consideration
of whether the fee charged is proportional to the impact of the
proposed development on whatever projects or services the govern-
ment desires to protect or promote via the fee.216 Given the fore-
going discussion about proportionality,217 this consideration ideally
should include evaluation of who uses the services or infrastructure
financed by the fee, what caused the need for additional or improved
services or infrastructure, and how the services and infrastructure
were or will be financed and maintained both historically and in the
future. In short, the smaller the logical connection between the
impact fee and the stated interest, or the less proportional the fee
to the putative impact of the proposed development project, the
closer the fee will come to qualifying as a taking. The greater the
connection and the more proportional the fee, the more this factor
will favor a conclusion that no taking has occurred.
Another issue that must be addressed is which party bears the
burden of proof with regard to these factors. Under the usual Penn
Central balancing test, the burden of showing that the regulation
213. See Kent, supra note 28, at 99-100. Admittedly, this interpretation is not entirely clear
from the Court’s cases. See id. at 100-01 (mentioning other views and concluding that the
character factor “remains one of the more difficult issues of takings analysis”).
214. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
215. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
216. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1994).
217. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
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results in a taking of property rests on the party challenging the
regulation.218 Under Nollan/Dolan, by contrast, the government
imposing the exaction bears the burden of demonstrating that the
exaction comports with the requirements of nexus and proportional-
ity.219 When portions of the two frameworks are combined, the
question becomes whether to place the burden on the government
or the challenger.
In keeping with Lingle’s emphasis on “functional equivalence,” I
think the better answer is to place the burden ultimately on the
party bringing the challenge. Shifting the burden to the government
makes sense when the regulatory action being challenged is a
physical occupation of property, like the easements at issue in
Nollan and Dolan. Because such action normally would qualify as
a categorical taking, it is reasonable to demand that the government
prove why no compensation should be in the offing.220 In the context
of physical exactions, that is the effect of the nexus and proportion-
ality requirements. They can be thought of as establishing a sort of
safe harbor by which the government might avoid compensation
for an otherwise compensable taking. Because an impact fee
normally will not trigger such categorical treatment, however, the
Nollan/Dolan justification for shifting the burden does not exist. In
sum, the two circumstances present markedly different default
positions in relation to the regulations at issue. A physical dedica-
tion of land in and of itself qualifies as a taking; whether the same
is true for an impact fee ultimately depends on the results of ad hoc
balancing. While the government justifiably bears the burden in the
former situation, in the latter, it should enjoy the ordinary position
of being able to demand that the party alleging a taking actually
prove its case.
218. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522-24 (1998) (plurality opinion) (applying
Penn Central and stating that “a party challenging governmental action as an unconsti-
tutional taking bears a substantial burden”).
219. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (placing burden on city to “make some sort of
individualized determination that the [exaction] is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development”).
220. Cf. id. at 391 n.8 (“[I]n evaluating most generally applicable zoning regulations, the
burden properly rests on the party challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes an
arbitrary regulation of property rights. Here ... the city made an adjudicative decision to
condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual parcel. In this
situation, the burden properly rests on the city.” (citations omitted)).
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Finally, it is useful to consider how the challenger might validly
attempt to prove a taking, especially with regard to the character
factor.221 I think that this might be done in at least two ways. First,
the party challenging an impact fee might demonstrate outright the
absence of nexus and proportionality by producing his own evidence
in relation to these issues. The more that nexus and proportionality
are lacking, the more the balancing test should favor the property
owner.222 Therefore, affirmative evidence showing that nexus and
proportionality are lacking will provide the strongest case that the
fee qualifies as a taking. 
Alternatively, because much of the data required for this inquiry
often will need to be developed contemporaneously with the
establishment of the fee, a challenger might proceed by demonstrat-
ing that the government failed to produce or consider any evidence
of nexus or proportionality at the time the fee was imposed.
Demonstrating that the government failed to take these issues into
consideration, while not dispositive, ordinarily should weigh against
the government to the extent it increases the inference of improper
leveraging and burden distribution. Where the challenger is suc-
cessful in this regard, the government should be afforded the
opportunity to put on evidence that the fees charged in fact do bear
a connection to the government’s stated interest and are propor-
tional to the development project under review.
It should be noted, however, that no adverse conclusion or pre-
sumption necessarily follows even where the government cannot
show that these standards are satisfied. While a failure of the
impact fee to meet the nexus and proportionality requirements
should weigh strongly against the government, and an absence of
evidence about these requirements in the government’s own
proceedings ordinarily will raise suspicion that the government
acted improperly, it must be remembered that the hybrid approach
utilizes the balancing test of Penn Central.223 For this reason, the
ultimate determination of whether a taking has occurred must
depend on the totality of the circumstances, with each prong
221. As noted earlier, I believe the economic impact factor should proceed more or less the
same way in impact fee cases as it does in all other challenges analyzed under Penn Central.
See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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informing the other. A fee that satisfies the nexus and proportional-
ity requirements should more easily withstand a takings challenge,
even though it results in a rather considerable impact on the fee
payer. Conversely, a fee not satisfying these requirements should be
more suspect, even though its economic impact is less significant.
But in either situation, both prongs must be viewed together.
C. Applications of a Hybrid Approach
It remains to demonstrate how the hybrid approach might apply
to some basic factual situations. Because transportation impact fees
are among the most prevalent type treated in the case law,224 they
provide a useful context in which to accomplish such an undertak-
ing. Accordingly, this Section applies the hybrid approach to three
scenarios involving the imposition of transportation impact fees on
the development of a hypothetical 200-unit residential subdivision.
Before jumping into the analysis, however, it should be noted that
the economic evaluation of these scenarios has been simplified by a
few basic assumptions. First, in each scenario, I assume that the fee
payer will be able to satisfy its obligation in cash, without the need
for borrowing the fee amount. This assumption precludes the need
to calculate the economic effect of interest or to consider the various
types of financing mechanisms that might be used by a fee payer. In
real litigation, of course, these facts would vary from case to case
and would need to be taken into account inasmuch as they help
reveal the economic effect on, and investment-backed expectations
of, the payer. 
Second, I have not included any figure for the lost time value of
money paid by the fee payer. Because impact fees normally are paid
at the beginning stages of development,225 a developer who paid the
fee out of pocket would forego the use of that money until it might
be recouped through sales of the constructed units. Thus, depending
on the circumstances, the issue of lost time value might be of
224. See generally Jack Estill, Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, Taxing Development:
The Law and Economics of Traffic Impact Fees, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 16-17 (2006)
(discussing the increased use of transportation impact fees).
225. See PLANNING & RESEARCH, INC., DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES, BEST PRACTICES PAPER
NO. 3, at 17 (2002), http://www.mag.maricopa.gov/pdf/cms.resource/Development-Impact-
Fees.pdf.
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particular importance and would also need to be considered in real
cases.
Third, and related to the issue of time value, I have assumed that
the land developer paying the fee does not pass the associated costs
on to third parties. Depending on a number of variables, the devel-
oper possibly could pass the fee “forward” to the homebuyer in the
form of an increased sales price or “backward” to the seller of the
raw land in the form of a decreased purchase price. The actual
ability of a developer to pass on the costs of impact fees is debated226
and would be a significant issue in actual litigation.
Finally, I have set each hypothetical scenario to occur in 2008, so
as to make easier the dollar-for-dollar comparisons of the different
impact fee regimes. Additionally, to determine the effect that each
hypothetical fee would have on the payer’s profits, I have assumed
a per-home construction cost of $265,376.65227 and a per-home sales
price of $292,600.00.228 I also assume that each housing unit in-
cluded in the hypothetical development plan will be built and sold
at these prices. Again, in actual cases, these numbers will vary
greatly and should be accounted for. Moreover, because I assume
that each proposed housing unit will be constructed and sold, I have
avoided the need to determine what effect the impact fees may have
on the developer’s ability actually to build the project as planned.
Because impact fees usually are assessed prior to construction,229
however, they may in some cases preclude or significantly limit the
development plan for which approval is sought. These consequences,
too, where present, will affect the payer’s expectations and should
be taken into account.
226. Compare Nelson, supra note 8, at 553 (opining that, in a competitive housing market,
“land developers and builders will pay impact fees out of their profit”), with Rosenberg, supra
note 8, at 214 (suggesting that, in a competitive housing market, fees are shifted and “do not
impose any burden on the land developer”).
227. I arrived at this number based on available information about the national average
cost of construction for a single family residence in early 2006, which was $105.35 per square
foot. See Christina Almeida, Subdivision Builders Try Life in the Big City, SEATTLE TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2006, at G1. Assuming this number remained constant through 2008, I then
multiplied it by the 2008 average square footage for a new single family home, as reported by
the United States Census Bureau—that is, 2519 square feet. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
HIGHLIGHTS OF ANNUAL 2008 CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW HOUSING, http://www.census.gov/
const/www/highanncharac2008.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
228. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 227.
229. See PLANNING & RESEARCH, INC., supra note 225, at 17.
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1. Scenario One—Both Factors Favor the Government
In 2008, Developer, Inc. sought approval for a 200-home subdivi-
sion located within the municipal limits of City.230 The land sought
to be developed lay within a certain area along Highway 150, which
City’s development code defines as the “150 Corridor.” After public
hearings on Developer’s application, City’s governing authority
approved the development plan subject to Developer’s paying
$74,716.00 in impact fees prior to receiving any building permits.
The fees were required by a City ordinance, enacted prior to
Developer’s application, that conditioned the issuance of any build-
ing permit for parcels located within the 150 Corridor on payment
of the fees. Pursuant to the ordinance, all fees paid must be set
aside for improving public roadways within the 150 Corridor. The
ordinance contained a legislative finding, based on professional
estimates, that new development in the 150 Corridor was expected
to generate approximately 40 percent of the trips made across the
improved roadways. An additional finding stated that, if all property
within the 150 Corridor were developed to its highest potential, the
impact fees associated with that development would pay only 30
percent of the total improvement cost.
In conjunction with the fee ordinance, City also adopted a fee
schedule showing how to calculate the fee owed by each new devel-
opment project. The figures listed in the schedule were categorized
according to the type of land use being developed, the square footage
of the structures being built, and the number of trips per day that
each use and structure could be expected to generate according to
professional traffic engineering manuals. Based on these variables,
the schedule estimated that the average single family residence
would generate approximately ten trips per day, with each trip
imposing a cost equal to $37.358 on the roadways within the 150
230. This scenario is based on the impact fee at issue in McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894
P.2d 836, 837-38 (Kan. 1995). The fee amount stated in that case, which I assume was in
effect when the case was decided in 1995, was $264.50 per residential unit. Id. at 838. This
amount has been converted to 2008 dollars by dividing it by a consumer price index
conversion factor of 0.708. See ROBERT SAHR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI) CONVERSION
FACTORS 1774 TO ESTIMATED 2019 TO CONVERT TO DOLLARS OF 2008 (2009), http://oregonstate.
edu/cla/polisci/faculty-research/sahr/cv2008.pdf. Thus, in 2008 dollars, the per unit fee would
be approximately $373.58 ($264.50 / 0.708 = $373.58), and the total fee for the hypothetical
subdivision would be $74,716.00 ($373.58 x 200 homes = $74,716.00).
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Corridor. Accordingly, the schedule imposed a fee of $373.58 on each
new single family residence constructed within the 150 Corridor.
The amount imposed on Developer was arrived at by multiplying
this figure by the 200 single family homes included in its develop-
ment plan. Developer paid the fee under protest and subsequently
sued City, alleging that the fee amounted to a taking of its property.
Analyzing this scenario under the hybrid approach proposed
above,231 it is difficult to find that this impact fee effects a taking.
First, keeping in mind the assumptions stated earlier, the economic
impact of the fee seems relatively minor, from both an objective and
a subjective standpoint. At a construction cost of $265,376.65 and a
sale price of $292,600.00 per home, without the impact fee Devel-
oper expected to realize a profit of $27,223.35 per home, or a total
profit of $5,444,670.00 for all 200 homes. The impact fee reduces
Developer’s per-home profit to $26,849.77 and overall profit to
$5,369,954.00, a decrease of approximately 1.5 percent. Thus, even
with the fee, Developer will be able to turn an objectively reasonable
profit in keeping with its own subjective expectations for the
property. For this reason, the first factor weighs against Developer’s
takings claim and in favor of the government.
The second factor likewise favors the government. As an initial
matter, the fee obviously bears a nexus to the government’s stated
interest in improving public roads within the 150 Corridor. Because
all of the revenue generated by the fee regime will be spent on
improving roads within that same geographical area, a logical
connection exists between the fee and the interest the government
seeks to promote.
Similarly, the fee seems roughly proportional to the impact the
proposed subdivision will have on the public roads in the 150
Corridor. Although City did not consider the actual impact of the
subdivision on each particular roadway to be improved, the fee
nonetheless was based on some individualized quantifications. The
amount of the fee, for example, was based on the residential nature
of the proposed subdivision, professional estimates of the probable
impact each home would have on the public roadways taken as a
whole, and the number of homes to be constructed. Moreover, al-
though there is room for improvement, the fee demonstrates some
231. See supra Part IV.B.
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understanding of who is expected to use the improved roads and
then assesses the costs of improvements roughly in corresponding
measure. Remembering that the Supreme Court does not require a
“precise mathematical calculation,”232 and given the minor economic
impact of the fee, nothing more should be required on these facts.
2. Scenario Two—Both Factors Favor the Challenger
Frustrated by the turn of events in City, Developer then sought
to build the same 200-home subdivision in nearby Village.233
Developer’s new proposed plan situated the subdivision along a
major thoroughfare called Valley Road. Although the governing
authority of Village granted approval for the subdivision, that
approval was conditioned on the payment of $22,598.87 per home,
for a total impact fee of $4,519,774.00.
As in City, the impact fee was imposed pursuant to a previously
enacted ordinance, which required that the fee be paid into a
separate account to be used solely for improvements to Valley Road.
The ordinance divided Valley Road into several segments, and the
fee was to be imposed along each segment only after traffic conges-
tion in that segment exceeded a specified threshold. Developer’s
planned project would adjoin Segment Seven, the threshold for
which was already exceeded due to existing traffic and other
approved but not yet constructed projects at the time Developer filed
its application. Developer’s project, however, was the first project
along Segment Seven against which the fee was assessed. The fee
232. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395 (1994).
233. This scenario is loosely based on the impact fee discussed in Save Our Peninsula
Committee v. Monterey County Board of Supervisors, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 326 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001). The fee in that case was adopted in 1995 and amounted to $16,000.00 per unit. See id.
at 353. As before, this amount has been converted to 2008 dollars by dividing it by a consumer
price index conversion factor of 0.708 using the formulas developed by Professor Sahr. See
SAHR, supra note 230. Thus, in 2008 dollars, the per unit fee would amount to approximately
$22,598.87 ($16,000 / 0.708 = $22,598.87), and the total fee for the hypothetical subdivision
would be $4,519,774.00 ($22,598.87 x 200 homes = $4,519,774.00). Although I do not have the
specific data, I am aware that single family residences in Monterey County, California during
the mid- to late-1990s generally sold at prices well above the national average. Moreover, I
understand that using national average cost and price figures in this hypothetical could tend
to make the economic impact of the fee much larger than it was in the actual case. This
hypothetical, however, is just that—a hypothetical—and is not intended to reflect the exact
economic conditions of the case on which it is based.
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amount was calculated by estimating the entire cost for all improve-
ments along Segment Seven and then dividing that number by
Developer’s 200 units.
Developer filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declara-
tion that the impact fees would constitute an unconstitutional
taking of its property. Under the hybrid approach, Developer has a
much better claim against Village than it had against City. First,
the economic impact of this fee regime is draconian. As before,
Developer’s expected profit without the fee was $27,223.35 per home
or $5,444,670.00 for the entire subdivision. The fee imposed by
Village reduces that profit to just $4,624.48 per home, or an overall
profit of $924,896.00, a decrease of approximately 83 percent. Such
a drastic reduction certainly disregards Developer’s subjective
expectations for the property, and, given that Developer’s plan was
based on national averages, it raises serious doubts that the profit
left to Developer is objectively reasonable. In sum, the economic
impact of the fee is substantial, and the first factor strongly
suggests that a taking has occurred.
Similarly, the fee fails to make a strong showing under the second
factor. As with the impact fee in Scenario One, there is a nexus
between the fee here—used to fund improvements along Segment
Seven of Valley Road—and the government’s stated interest in
adopting the fee—to construct improvements along various portions
of Valley Road as the need arose. But this fee is utterly lacking in
proportionality. First, despite the fact that the specified threshold
was already exceeded by existing and anticipated traffic, the entire
cost of improvements was assessed against one development project
without any consideration of these other users and causes. More
damning, however, is the complete lack of evidence as to the impact
of the subdivision on the portion of the road in question. Unlike the
previous impact fee adopted by City, this fee was calculated without
any seeming consideration for the nature of the development or the
trips per day that it could be expected to generate. Rather, the fee
amount was based entirely on the costs of constructing the improve-
ments. The only “individualized quantification” was dividing that
number by the number of units Developer chose to build. On these
facts, with a severe economic impact and a complete absence of
proportionality, Developer would have a good case that a taking had
occurred.
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3. Scenario Three—One Factor Favors Each Side 
The first two scenarios presented fairly easy cases on the
extremes. Scenario One involved a fee producing a minor economic
impact that was more or less proportional to the development
project against which it was assessed. Scenario Two, by contrast,
involved a fee that resulted in drastic losses to the payer and that
made no real attempt at proportionality whatsoever. Most cases,
however, will likely fall somewhere in the middle of these two
scenarios, and such a case is presented by my final hypothetical.
A few months after its successful lawsuit against Village,
Developer decided to build the same 200-home subdivision in
another nearby municipality, known as Town. As in the other two
locations, Town’s governing authority approved the proposed dev-
elopment plan subject to Developer paying a fee of $780,202.00.234
The fee was imposed pursuant to the local development code, which
required that all substandard local and collector streets abutting
new subdivisions be reconstructed by the subdivision developer at
no cost to Town. The term “substandard” was not defined in the
development code.
The amount of the fee, which came to $3,901.01 per home, was
calculated based on the cost of rebuilding Simmons Road, an asphalt
road abutting the proposed subdivision, with concrete. Developer
requested relief from the fee requirement on two grounds. First,
Developer pointed out that Simmons Road was not currently in
disrepair, a fact that Town conceded. Developer argued that this
completely negated the need for any reconstruction. Second,
Developer’s own traffic studies indicated that the subdivision would
234. This scenario is based on the fee at issue in Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates
Ltd. Partnership, 135 S.W.3d 620, 623-24 (Tex. 2004). The fee, which was paid in 1998, see
Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 71 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Tex. App. 2002),
totaled $484,303.79 and was assessed against two phases of a three-phase development
containing 247 homes. See Town of Flower Mound, 135 S.W.3d at 623-24. Because the phases
were “roughly equal,” id. at 623, the two phases subject to the fee would have contained
approximately 164 homes (247 homes / 3 phases = 82.333 homes per phase x 2 phases =
164.666). Thus, the per unit fee would have been roughly $2,953.07 ($484,303.79 / 164 =
$2,953.07). This amount has been converted into 2008 dollars by dividing it by a consumer
price index conversion factor of 0.757. See SAHR, supra note 230. Thus, in 2008 dollars, the per
unit fee would amount to approximately $3,901.01 ($2,953.07 / 0.757 = $3,901.01), and the
total fee for the hypothetical subdivision would be $780,202.00 ($3,901.01 x 200 homes =
$780,202.00).
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increase traffic on Simmons Road by only 18 percent. Accordingly,
Developer maintained that, even assuming the reconstruction was
needed, Developer should not have to bear the entire cost. Town
produced no traffic data of its own, but it nonetheless denied the
request for relief. Developer then filed suit, asserting that the
conditional approval amounted to a taking of its property.
As suggested, this scenario presents a harder case under the
hybrid approach than either of the foregoing situations. As an initial
matter, it is difficult to say whether the economic impact of the fee,
standing alone, should be considered substantial. Once again,
without the fee, Developer expects to realize a profit of $27,223.35
per home, or $5,444,670.00 for the entire subdivision. Paying the fee
results in a profit of $23,322.34 per home, or $4,664,468.00 for the
subdivision. Thus, the fee reduces the expected profit by approxi-
mately 15 percent. While this certainly is not an insignificant
amount, it does leave Developer a respectable profit that is not
exceedingly removed from its own designs. Moreover, in contexts not
involving exactions, the conventional wisdom seems to be that the
economic impact factor contemplates a much larger diminution than
would be present here.235
As stated above, however, the magnitude of the economic impact
must be informed to some extent by the degree to which nexus and
proportionality are present.236 Because exactions present a unique
opportunity for the government to impose general costs on only one
class of land development, the absence of these requirements raises
serious questions about the character of the government’s action.237
When the government leverages its regulatory powers to require
disproportionate funding of general municipal services, then a fee
that produces even a relatively slight economic impact looks much
more insidious.238
This scenario presents a useful example. To begin with, it is not
clear that the fee bears the required nexus to the government’s
stated interest. The legislation imposing the fee ostensibly was
235. See Kent, supra note 28, at 97 & n.190 (indicating that the “functional equivalence”
standard suggests a need for “near-absolute reduction in value” and listing other commen-
tators who think similarly).
236. See supra Part IV.B.
237. See supra Part IV.B.
238. See supra Part IV.B.
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designed to alleviate the problems caused by development abutting
“substandard” roads. But the legislation contains no criteria for
labeling any particular road as “substandard,” and the road at issue
here admittedly is not in disrepair. Thus, as in Nollan,239 the fee
being exacted looks more like a plan of extortion by which to garner
free favors for the public than a police power regulation designed to
remedy a real land use problem.
Furthermore, the fee seemingly was imposed without any con-
sideration of the impact the subdivision might have on Simmons
Road. The only evidence of an impact indicated that the subdivision
would increase traffic by 18 percent. Town produced no studies
showing that this increase would require any repairs to the road at
all, much less that it would require the demolition of the existing
asphalt road and reconstruction in concrete. Nor did Town offer any
justification for placing 100 percent of the reconstruction costs at
the feet of a subdivision causing at most 18 percent of the need.
Viewing the economic impact together with the lack of nexus and
proportionality, this impact fee probably amounts to a taking under
the hybrid analysis. Because improper leveraging appears to be at
play here, the economic impact is sufficiently significant to trigger
a taking, even though the same 15 percent reduction may not be
sufficient on different facts. 
CONCLUSION
Development impact fees present a flexible and attractive
financing mechanism for local governments, and all signs suggest
that their use will continue to increase.240 With this increase, it
is reasonable to expect that the number of legal challenges will
grow as well, especially those based on the Takings Clause.
Unfortunately, analyzing takings challenges to impact fees has
proved to be particularly problematic, in large part because impact
fees do not fit neatly within existing legal paradigms. Rather, they
must be viewed as hybrid animals that occupy a space at the
theoretical and doctrinal crossroads of takings jurisprudence,
239. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
240. See GORDON SHUFORD & RICHARD YOUNG, A REPORT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT FUNDING:
AN OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL ISSUES AND TRENDS 37 (2000), http://www.strom.clemson.edu/
teams/ced/lgp-reports/Trends.pdf.
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property law, and the rules applicable to local government financ-
ing. Any framework used to analyze takings challenges to impact
fees must take this hybrid quality into account.
Accordingly, this Article proposes that such challenges be
analyzed under a hybrid framework that combines the factor-
balancing of Penn Central with the nexus and proportionality
requirements of Nollan/Dolan. Such an approach avoids formalistic,
bright-line distinctions, accounts for both the differences and
similarities between physical and monetary exactions, protects
property owners against the unique dangers posed by exactions of
either type, and recognizes the complexity of impact fees as a
municipal financing mechanism. Equally important, the hybrid
approach comports with the Supreme Court’s recent emphases on
“functional equivalence” and “unconstitutional conditions,”241 help-
ing to preserve the progress toward clarity and consistency made by
the Court in Lingle.
In addition to the hybrid framework, however, the foregoing
discussions suggest a few larger implications. First, the problem of
impact fees raises questions concerning the appropriate understand-
ing of “property” for purposes of the Takings Clause: How broadly
should we define the “property” that can be taken by government
action? If limitations should be imposed on the meaning of “prop-
erty,” where should we draw the line? Should land enjoy a favored
status in the law of takings, or should all types of “property,” how-
ever defined, be treated more or less equally? How should we treat
monetary obligations? Although this Article has made some attempt
to answer these questions in the unique context of impact fees, more
work by courts and scholars on these issues would go a long way to
clarifying our understanding of what constitutes a regulatory taking
in the first instance.
Very much related to these questions is the general doctrinal
separation between taxes and takings. To what extent is this
dichotomy sound and to what extent should it continue? Is there a
good explanation of the difference between a tax and a taking, and
how might courts go about determining that difference in real cases?
If no secure basis exists for drawing the distinction, then how, if at
all, should the law adapt? Some scholars indeed have begun tackling
241. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539, 547 (2005).
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the relationship between taxes and takings, but more work is
needed here as well.
Finally, at the very least, the problem of impact fees demon-
strates that the law of regulatory takings continues to require
refinement, even after the progress made by Lingle. If I am correct
that Lingle places functional equivalence, burden distribution, and
unconstitutional conditions at the heart of the takings inquiry, then
how do those doctrines apply to the various types of property that
conceivably might be taken? How, precisely, do those doctrines
relate to one another? Is it possible to develop a single theory of
takings that yields a coherent picture of these doctrines, their
interrelationship, and the rules of decision that flow from them?
Admittedly, I believe that Lingle helped to clarify the law of regu-
latory takings immensely. But the problem of impact fees leaves one
asking to what extent more clarity might be provided. 

